In my previous post, I described how configurability is something that techies love and cherish, and how they hate to be unable to get at the workings of a device. Given this, it's no surprise that many of us loathe most software with a fiery vengeance. Your average piece of commercial software is a "binary blob" - a string of ones and zeroes with no meaning to anyone but the computer. That represents a hideous restriction on the techie's ability to tinker with the thing.
Worse, it's a restriction that (in the strictest sense) is unnecessary. By publishing their source code, companies could solve this problem in an instant (they'd probably go out of business, but that's another issue). In fact, until about 30 years ago, that was precisely what usually happened with software. It wasn't until the late 60s, when Bill Gates sent out his infamous Open Letter to Hobbyists, that the concept of Intellectual Property really started to have an effect on software geeks.
Hard-core techies have begun to fight back. The first one to really go for the throat in this battle of cultures was a guy called Richard Stallman. In appearance and in habits he's pretty much the archetype of a techie, so it's no surprise that he should also have this drive to customise. After hitting a barrier with "closed-source" software on a printer (see here for details), Stallman struck back by creating a software license called the GPL that explicitly protected key freedoms for the user:
* The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0).
* The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
* The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2).
* The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
It has taken a long time to happen, but the GPL and its kindred "Free Software" licenses (that's free as in freedom, not free as in beer - you can usually make money selling Free Software) have started to make an impression. Maybe you've heard of Firefox? How about Apache, the most popular web server in the world? Even if you're not a geek, you might well have heard of Linux, the ultimate techie operating system. These are becoming ever more widespread. And techies the world over are rejoicing.
The Dangers of Evangelism
In fact, many of them are in some ways rejoicing too much. It's become a characteristic of the techie stereotype: we waffle on about Linux to people who aren't the least bit interested. It doesn't do any good to anyone, and it creates extremely poor Quality in our interactions with these people. Why don't we keep our powder dry, saving our spiel for those times when it can actually have an effect?
The answer is simple: we expect other people to think like us. It's intrinsically hard for human beings to realise that other people do not have the same balance of motivations as we do. In this case, techies assume that other people will have the same urge to proactively improve the Quality of their environment, the same drive to tinker with machines until their behaviour matches our desires - and the same frustration when we're artificially shut off from those opportunities.
If you possess those qualities, Free Software will be an inherently interesting concept for you. But, if you don't, the beauty of this concept will simply not exist for you. "Free Software is wonderful" is not a statement that contains any truth for most people. When we evangelise to these people, we're burning up valuable time, energy - and Quality.
This is a general feature of evangelism. For example, Christians who truly feel the joy of Jesus's presence inside them naturally assume that the motivations that give Quality to this relationship apply to everyone. They don't. Not everyone feels the need to subsume themselves in the Holy Spirit, and many people (myself included) are rather disturbed by the idea and its effects.
The same goes for lovers of sports, politics and alternative therapies. When we evangelise without casting an eye towards this issue of Quality, we become bores.
Read the full post
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Saturday, November 25, 2006
Poor Quality in action: unwanted assistance
As of half a year ago, I'm finally learning to drive. I've gotten to the point where it's actually safe to let me in a car with dual controls and, in a desperate attempt at learning to stall less before my practical test, I've been driving many miles a weekend with a parent in tow.
In the last few weeks, I've discovered many things that annoy me about driving. Assholes who think that learners are there to be dominated, worn-out road markings at roundabouts, the difficulty of doing ten things at once. But there's one thing, and only one, that's been really driving (ahem) me up the wall.
You know how indicator lights in modern cars automatically switch themselves off when you've finished turning? Yeah, that.
The problem is simple. When I indicate left whilst turning right (or vice versa), the indicator system assumes that I've made a horrible mistake, and helpfully corrects that mistake by deactivating itself. However, sometimes it's necessary to signal in that fashion, for example when coming off a small roundabout. In these circumstances, signalling the "wrong" way is exactly correct - so it always catches me by surprise when I find I actually need to hold the bloody lever down to keep the indicator on.
That's fairly annoying - but so is much of driving. Why should it be this that irritates me the most?
I've always had a deep loathing of wonderfully helpful little features that are impossible to disable. And it's actually a problem that shows up quite a lot. For example, my mobile phone is convinced that the first letter after any full stop should be a capital (thus completely ignoring the common use of abbrev. in txt communication). My suspicion is that this is a general feature of technically-minded people - just look at the backlash against Clippy.
It's interesting to consider why this should be so. Why are techies so averse to machines attempting to be too clever? It's almost as if we're one step away from being Luddites - why is this the case?
I think it all comes down to control. The driving passion of the technophile, the sheer joy of experimentation, comes from a strongly increased feeling of control over one's environment. In the human psyche, control is heavily linked with survival instincts - hence, for example, the elaborate rituals of human dominance - so it's easy for such a relationship with technology to become a focus of Quality. In other words, we get our kicks making machines do our bidding. What the hey, everyone needs a hobby.
To a geek, the idea of a helpful feature is sheer pleasure - but the existence of such a feature that you can't turn off is a studied insult. It's a deliberate, callous limitation of the techie's ability to shape the machine to their will. No matter how many blue flashing LEDs it has, such a creation is fundamentally poor Quality - a diseased device deliberately rendered incapable of fulfilling its owner's desires. A feature of this sort is worse than useless: it's actively repulsive.
Someday, maybe techies will have great enough market share that designers start considering issues like this. Until then, I guess I'm just going to have to put up with this bloody indicator.
Read the full post
In the last few weeks, I've discovered many things that annoy me about driving. Assholes who think that learners are there to be dominated, worn-out road markings at roundabouts, the difficulty of doing ten things at once. But there's one thing, and only one, that's been really driving (ahem) me up the wall.
You know how indicator lights in modern cars automatically switch themselves off when you've finished turning? Yeah, that.
The problem is simple. When I indicate left whilst turning right (or vice versa), the indicator system assumes that I've made a horrible mistake, and helpfully corrects that mistake by deactivating itself. However, sometimes it's necessary to signal in that fashion, for example when coming off a small roundabout. In these circumstances, signalling the "wrong" way is exactly correct - so it always catches me by surprise when I find I actually need to hold the bloody lever down to keep the indicator on.
That's fairly annoying - but so is much of driving. Why should it be this that irritates me the most?
I've always had a deep loathing of wonderfully helpful little features that are impossible to disable. And it's actually a problem that shows up quite a lot. For example, my mobile phone is convinced that the first letter after any full stop should be a capital (thus completely ignoring the common use of abbrev. in txt communication). My suspicion is that this is a general feature of technically-minded people - just look at the backlash against Clippy.
It's interesting to consider why this should be so. Why are techies so averse to machines attempting to be too clever? It's almost as if we're one step away from being Luddites - why is this the case?
I think it all comes down to control. The driving passion of the technophile, the sheer joy of experimentation, comes from a strongly increased feeling of control over one's environment. In the human psyche, control is heavily linked with survival instincts - hence, for example, the elaborate rituals of human dominance - so it's easy for such a relationship with technology to become a focus of Quality. In other words, we get our kicks making machines do our bidding. What the hey, everyone needs a hobby.
To a geek, the idea of a helpful feature is sheer pleasure - but the existence of such a feature that you can't turn off is a studied insult. It's a deliberate, callous limitation of the techie's ability to shape the machine to their will. No matter how many blue flashing LEDs it has, such a creation is fundamentally poor Quality - a diseased device deliberately rendered incapable of fulfilling its owner's desires. A feature of this sort is worse than useless: it's actively repulsive.
Someday, maybe techies will have great enough market share that designers start considering issues like this. Until then, I guess I'm just going to have to put up with this bloody indicator.
Read the full post
Some things never change
OK, so I was out at the pub (or, rather, an array of pubs) with friends from work last night. At one point, we ran into a bunch of other people from work, one of whom was with a group of other friends.
And one of those other friends was someone I knew from my school days. Oh horror, I was about to be outed as a complete nerd in front of the people to whom I had been trying to project an image of normality.
Actually, that turned out not to be a problem - I think I managed to bluff my way through, with much manly handshaking and very little cowering in horror.
But then the guy from my work did something I honestly hadn't expected. "You know, Lifewish, that girl over there [one of the others from work] fancies you. Hey, Sarah*, come over here!"
How very schoolyard.
The problem, though, is that, while I may have been exposed to this particular method of putting someone on the spot whilst I was in secondary school, I'm still not sure how to deal with it. I think I handled it at the time by glaring at the guy and turning to talk to someone else, but that just shows that he managed to get to me - a sign of weakness. It also leaves poor Sarah in the lurch somewhat.
I could have gone the other way, and played along. However, I'm honestly not sure I know the rules for that game well enough. And again that merely validates Andy's approach and leaves Sarah with the bill (metaphorically speaking).
I could have tried to turn the tables, for example by getting to Sarah first and telling her loudly that Andy was calling her over to say how much he fancied her. That's getting warmer in its probable effect on Andy, but means I'm actively contributing to the winding up of Sarah.
What I really need if I'm to achieve Quality in this area is a simple approach that will:
1) cut Andy off before he can mess Sarah about
2) leave Andy looking foolish
3) not require me to be an asshole
Any thoughts?
(Disclaimer: neither Andy nor I was remotely sober at the time, so it's always possible I've misunderstood him or his motivation - albeit IMO not likely. Regardless, it's still an interesting question.)
* Name changed to protect the probably innocent - it's highly unlikely that she does in fact fancy me, and even less likely that she'd tell Andy** about it. Actually it's infinitely more probable that she fancies Andy, the company heartthrob, which makes the whole debacle even nastier.
** The guilty deserve no protection. However, there are half a dozen Andys at my work, including some lovely chaps, so anyone who knows my secret identity should not draw conclusions.
Read the full post
And one of those other friends was someone I knew from my school days. Oh horror, I was about to be outed as a complete nerd in front of the people to whom I had been trying to project an image of normality.
Actually, that turned out not to be a problem - I think I managed to bluff my way through, with much manly handshaking and very little cowering in horror.
But then the guy from my work did something I honestly hadn't expected. "You know, Lifewish, that girl over there [one of the others from work] fancies you. Hey, Sarah*, come over here!"
How very schoolyard.
The problem, though, is that, while I may have been exposed to this particular method of putting someone on the spot whilst I was in secondary school, I'm still not sure how to deal with it. I think I handled it at the time by glaring at the guy and turning to talk to someone else, but that just shows that he managed to get to me - a sign of weakness. It also leaves poor Sarah in the lurch somewhat.
I could have gone the other way, and played along. However, I'm honestly not sure I know the rules for that game well enough. And again that merely validates Andy's approach and leaves Sarah with the bill (metaphorically speaking).
I could have tried to turn the tables, for example by getting to Sarah first and telling her loudly that Andy was calling her over to say how much he fancied her. That's getting warmer in its probable effect on Andy, but means I'm actively contributing to the winding up of Sarah.
What I really need if I'm to achieve Quality in this area is a simple approach that will:
1) cut Andy off before he can mess Sarah about
2) leave Andy looking foolish
3) not require me to be an asshole
Any thoughts?
(Disclaimer: neither Andy nor I was remotely sober at the time, so it's always possible I've misunderstood him or his motivation - albeit IMO not likely. Regardless, it's still an interesting question.)
* Name changed to protect the probably innocent - it's highly unlikely that she does in fact fancy me, and even less likely that she'd tell Andy** about it. Actually it's infinitely more probable that she fancies Andy, the company heartthrob, which makes the whole debacle even nastier.
** The guilty deserve no protection. However, there are half a dozen Andys at my work, including some lovely chaps, so anyone who knows my secret identity should not draw conclusions.
Read the full post
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Like a bat outta hell...
...I'll be gone in half an hour to get an early night.
I'm aware that that's not exactly what the song was referring to - but, as far as filling life to the full goes, I'm on a roll. In fact, I'm on a roll call. I've just started a new job and it's rather hectic.
Usefully, the job is at a company that has a very strong ethos of Quality. Hopefully I shall have much to pass on (in suitably generic terms, of course).
Hey, any company that can have me getting to bed by 10:00 must have something going for it :)
Read the full post
I'm aware that that's not exactly what the song was referring to - but, as far as filling life to the full goes, I'm on a roll. In fact, I'm on a roll call. I've just started a new job and it's rather hectic.
Usefully, the job is at a company that has a very strong ethos of Quality. Hopefully I shall have much to pass on (in suitably generic terms, of course).
Hey, any company that can have me getting to bed by 10:00 must have something going for it :)
Read the full post
Thursday, November 02, 2006
What ID wasn't
A comment at a blog I frequent just gave me reason to search back through history to find a mock journal I once produced. The subject: what an actual mathematical discovery of Intelligent Design would have looked like. On rereading, it's mostly still good, so I'm copying it here for safe keeping.
January 2006: First draft of paper completed.
February 2006: Paper discussed with supervisor in depth. Minor alterations made to strengthen the argument with respect to some pathological cases. Supervisor points out that one section is irrelevant, so it's removed. Extra section added to eliminate previously unconsidered option.
March 2006: Paper now 100% ready. Submitted it to prestigious mathematics journal.
May 2006: Finally heard back from journal. Paper rejected by reviewer with a snarky comment about an error in section 3. Will get back to this once I've finished grading exam scripts.
June 2006: Paper corrected and resubmitted.
July 2006: Paper accepted.
August 2006: Paper finally published. Almost immediately am contacted by three people who think I'm badly wrong, but it turns out to be a result of printer's error. Another objection comes in, this one valid. Get contacted by rather confused-sounding journalist - local newspaper prints short article. Remaining mail is mainly positive, includes compliments on novel use of Zorn's Lemma and a request that I give a seminar.
September 2006: Figure out how to bypass the valid objection, write up as paper, submit to journal. This one gets in without much trouble - the reviewer responded impressively quickly. Give seminar, attendees seem bored but perk up quickly when I mention the implications for bioinformatics. Much use of photocopier afterwards.
November 2006: New paper published, get mildly snowed under with email. Minor mention on BBC website. Start getting crank calls complaining about inferred attempt to "know the mind of God".
December 2006: Paper discussed on popular evolutionary biology forum, attempted rebuttal by resident mathematician. Engage in short debate about Axiom of Choice, opponent concedes defeat. Asked to give rundown on implications for biology. Asked to comment on genetic algorithms and evolutionary simulations, explain why result doesn't apply to these. Asked about falsifiability, explain how the approach used permits "interventions" to be pinned down and analysed. Implication is that detailed hypotheses can be developed - no "big tent" for us!
January 2007: Story picked up by New Scientist (they misspelled my name of course). Crank calls increase in volume. Am forced to get new email address. Research group formed to discuss results, seems promising. Story picked up by Guardian and Sun ("Egghead Explodes Evolution").
Two vitriolic attempted rebuttals, one on a biology blog claiming I'm wrong and one from the Design Institute complaining I'm stealing their idea. One of my new postgrads does a detailed rebuttal of the biology blog one, then writes the central thesis up as a formal paper. He'll go far, if he doesn't waste too much time on the internet.
Asked to speak in Cambridge, Oxford, Hull. Accept the Cambridge and Hull offers.
Accept offer to speak at local evangelical event. Get booed off stage after using phrases "outmoded superstition" and "put the Designer under the microscope".
March 2007: Research group expanded, having to turn away applicants. Promoted. Awarded three honorary doctorates. Still getting the crank calls, but not so much email. Postgrad figures out chemical signature apparently associated with "interventions". MIT researcher uses modified cladistic technique to pinpoint exact dates of interventions, turns out there are 6 detectable ones.
April 2007: Am contacted by geologist specialising in trace mineral concentrations of post-Cambrian strata, with comment about a strange hydrocarbon found at approximate dates of interventions. Do joint paper for Nature - accepted almost immediately.
June 2007: Contacted by NASA - apparently the trace hydrocarbon appears as a byproduct of an experimental low-orbit propulsion system they've been working on for two years. Asked to keep things under wraps for a couple of weeks til they can get the patent application sorted out.
Two new research groups formed to work parallel to our group. Friendly rivalry emerges, regular collaboration on papers defuses possible tension. Particular focus on what exact biological structures are results of intervention. Am happy to say that we regularly steal their best postgrads.
July 2007: Propulsion story leaked to Sun ("Alien Conspiracy!"). Seems everyone is talking about our research. Minor riots in several areas, university burned down in Iran (quote of the day: "they will either contradict the Quran, so they are heresy, or they will agree with it, so they are superfluous"). Research endorsed by Raelians, criticised by Scientologists (their objection is something about Xenu and volcanoes).
August 2007: Richard Dawkins sends me heartfelt gratitude for "proving me wrong all these years", plus early draft of new book "Of Alleles And Astronauts". Am apparently the subject of a fatwa by prominent Saudi cleric. More crank calls, death threats etc (much repetition of "I ain't no alien experiment").
Nominated for Fields Medal, Nobel Prize.
Early 2008: NASA funding increased, ESA funding increased, competition to be first in locating a Designer artifact heats up. International conference of biochemistry convened to discuss plausible techniques used by Designers. Conference a great success - "design signature" chemical turns out to effectively immobilise DNA, allowing for detailed biomolecular surgery. Nanoengineers gatecrash, start discussing applications for solar panels.
Mid 2008: Awarded professorship at Cambridge. Best part: no bloody undergrads to deal with. Take sabbatical before accepting position, work on book (no doubt it'll be outsold by Dawkins, but a man's gotta try). Title: "A Brief History of Slime". Give guest lectures in Japan, Russia, America, New Zealand. Disney attempts to buy movie rights, but I cut them off when they mention changing the name to "The Eternal Triangle".
Now have three full-time bodyguards to guard against:
a) pissed-off religious folk
b) freaked-out nonreligious folk
c) alien-related death cults
Late 2008: Alien structure discovered on Mars. Martial law declared in South Carolina in aftermath. Rush by world's engineers to examine the finds is intense. One engineer attempts to shorten the waiting list by judicious assassination.
One of the artifacts turns out to be some sort of faster-than-light conveyance. This is going to be interesting...
Postscript
I think I'll end there, given that it's getting quite long enough. I guess the moral of the story is that, if you prove that evolution didn't happen, it doesn't stop there. Saying "we've disproved evolution, yet we have absolutely no interest in trying to find out what did actually happen" is a fairly reprehensible attitude from anyone claiming to be a scientist.
Quite apart from anything else, this was extremely fun to write. There may be a science fiction story in it somewhere. Thanks to Andrew Rowell for the inspiration.
Read the full post
January 2006: First draft of paper completed.
February 2006: Paper discussed with supervisor in depth. Minor alterations made to strengthen the argument with respect to some pathological cases. Supervisor points out that one section is irrelevant, so it's removed. Extra section added to eliminate previously unconsidered option.
March 2006: Paper now 100% ready. Submitted it to prestigious mathematics journal.
May 2006: Finally heard back from journal. Paper rejected by reviewer with a snarky comment about an error in section 3. Will get back to this once I've finished grading exam scripts.
June 2006: Paper corrected and resubmitted.
July 2006: Paper accepted.
August 2006: Paper finally published. Almost immediately am contacted by three people who think I'm badly wrong, but it turns out to be a result of printer's error. Another objection comes in, this one valid. Get contacted by rather confused-sounding journalist - local newspaper prints short article. Remaining mail is mainly positive, includes compliments on novel use of Zorn's Lemma and a request that I give a seminar.
September 2006: Figure out how to bypass the valid objection, write up as paper, submit to journal. This one gets in without much trouble - the reviewer responded impressively quickly. Give seminar, attendees seem bored but perk up quickly when I mention the implications for bioinformatics. Much use of photocopier afterwards.
November 2006: New paper published, get mildly snowed under with email. Minor mention on BBC website. Start getting crank calls complaining about inferred attempt to "know the mind of God".
December 2006: Paper discussed on popular evolutionary biology forum, attempted rebuttal by resident mathematician. Engage in short debate about Axiom of Choice, opponent concedes defeat. Asked to give rundown on implications for biology. Asked to comment on genetic algorithms and evolutionary simulations, explain why result doesn't apply to these. Asked about falsifiability, explain how the approach used permits "interventions" to be pinned down and analysed. Implication is that detailed hypotheses can be developed - no "big tent" for us!
January 2007: Story picked up by New Scientist (they misspelled my name of course). Crank calls increase in volume. Am forced to get new email address. Research group formed to discuss results, seems promising. Story picked up by Guardian and Sun ("Egghead Explodes Evolution").
Two vitriolic attempted rebuttals, one on a biology blog claiming I'm wrong and one from the Design Institute complaining I'm stealing their idea. One of my new postgrads does a detailed rebuttal of the biology blog one, then writes the central thesis up as a formal paper. He'll go far, if he doesn't waste too much time on the internet.
Asked to speak in Cambridge, Oxford, Hull. Accept the Cambridge and Hull offers.
Accept offer to speak at local evangelical event. Get booed off stage after using phrases "outmoded superstition" and "put the Designer under the microscope".
March 2007: Research group expanded, having to turn away applicants. Promoted. Awarded three honorary doctorates. Still getting the crank calls, but not so much email. Postgrad figures out chemical signature apparently associated with "interventions". MIT researcher uses modified cladistic technique to pinpoint exact dates of interventions, turns out there are 6 detectable ones.
April 2007: Am contacted by geologist specialising in trace mineral concentrations of post-Cambrian strata, with comment about a strange hydrocarbon found at approximate dates of interventions. Do joint paper for Nature - accepted almost immediately.
June 2007: Contacted by NASA - apparently the trace hydrocarbon appears as a byproduct of an experimental low-orbit propulsion system they've been working on for two years. Asked to keep things under wraps for a couple of weeks til they can get the patent application sorted out.
Two new research groups formed to work parallel to our group. Friendly rivalry emerges, regular collaboration on papers defuses possible tension. Particular focus on what exact biological structures are results of intervention. Am happy to say that we regularly steal their best postgrads.
July 2007: Propulsion story leaked to Sun ("Alien Conspiracy!"). Seems everyone is talking about our research. Minor riots in several areas, university burned down in Iran (quote of the day: "they will either contradict the Quran, so they are heresy, or they will agree with it, so they are superfluous"). Research endorsed by Raelians, criticised by Scientologists (their objection is something about Xenu and volcanoes).
August 2007: Richard Dawkins sends me heartfelt gratitude for "proving me wrong all these years", plus early draft of new book "Of Alleles And Astronauts". Am apparently the subject of a fatwa by prominent Saudi cleric. More crank calls, death threats etc (much repetition of "I ain't no alien experiment").
Nominated for Fields Medal, Nobel Prize.
Early 2008: NASA funding increased, ESA funding increased, competition to be first in locating a Designer artifact heats up. International conference of biochemistry convened to discuss plausible techniques used by Designers. Conference a great success - "design signature" chemical turns out to effectively immobilise DNA, allowing for detailed biomolecular surgery. Nanoengineers gatecrash, start discussing applications for solar panels.
Mid 2008: Awarded professorship at Cambridge. Best part: no bloody undergrads to deal with. Take sabbatical before accepting position, work on book (no doubt it'll be outsold by Dawkins, but a man's gotta try). Title: "A Brief History of Slime". Give guest lectures in Japan, Russia, America, New Zealand. Disney attempts to buy movie rights, but I cut them off when they mention changing the name to "The Eternal Triangle".
Now have three full-time bodyguards to guard against:
a) pissed-off religious folk
b) freaked-out nonreligious folk
c) alien-related death cults
Late 2008: Alien structure discovered on Mars. Martial law declared in South Carolina in aftermath. Rush by world's engineers to examine the finds is intense. One engineer attempts to shorten the waiting list by judicious assassination.
One of the artifacts turns out to be some sort of faster-than-light conveyance. This is going to be interesting...
Postscript
I think I'll end there, given that it's getting quite long enough. I guess the moral of the story is that, if you prove that evolution didn't happen, it doesn't stop there. Saying "we've disproved evolution, yet we have absolutely no interest in trying to find out what did actually happen" is a fairly reprehensible attitude from anyone claiming to be a scientist.
Quite apart from anything else, this was extremely fun to write. There may be a science fiction story in it somewhere. Thanks to Andrew Rowell for the inspiration.
Read the full post
Quality in maths
I've covered plenty of ground on the issue of quality in science, so I'd like to take a brief moment to discuss something that I actually... uh... know anything the heck about: mathematics.
Mathematics is actually easier to understand than science to anyone with any knowledge of basic logical discourse. In principle, it's quite simple: choose a bunch of axioms whose truth defines your system, recombine them to produce other true statements, and gradually work your way up to the conclusion you were after.
This description is perfect, apart from one thing: no real mathematician actually bothers to do that. Over the years a methodology has emerged that's considerably more practical and is essentially equivalent to this idealised approach. So failure to conform to the ideal is not itself evidence of poor Quality.
All maths is trivial
There is a mathematical theorem, an an area known as propositional calculus, which says that all mathematical theorems are tautological. Now, they're using "tautological" in a far more rigorous sense than you or I, but the impression given by this quote is useful in other ways - it does convey a vaguely accurate perception of what's going on.
A mathematical proof exists as a set of definitions combined with a series of logical steps. The hard part for a non-mathematician is that the definitions may use prepackaged terms ("let X be the dihedral group D_2n, and Y a Sylow subgroup of order pm for m>1...") and the logic may skip large steps ("...then p divides n"). So in general it won't be possible for a non-mathematician to verify a proof without either learning a bit about the field or finding a helpful mathematician.
What would the mathematician do to verify the proof? Well, firstly, she would confirm she knew what all the definitions meant. Then she would go through the proof, figuring out which steps were obviously valid based on those definitions. Her response to the remaining few steps would be more interesting: she would break them down into smaller substeps.
This is where the "triviality" of mathematics comes into play. Large steps in logic are (in theory at least) mere shorthand for a whole bunch of shorter, more complex steps. So, for example, if I want to prove a differential equation I could use a giant step taken from the field of Fourier analysis. This would break down into smaller steps from the internal logic of the same field, which would effectively be huge steps taken from the field of complex analysis. These would break down into smaller steps from the field of naive set theory, which IIRC can be justified in terms of axiomatic set theory, and so on...
What value does being a mathematician have in this circumstance? Why couldn't a layman do this? There are three reasons. Firstly, the mathematician will generally have some hard-earned intuition about the objects being defined, and will be able to "verify" many of the steps by sheer instinct. She would be able to verify them by hand if necessary, but that's often just a massive waste of time.
Secondly, the mathematician will know where to look for information about the remaining steps. She will have some idea of which journals to check, which individuals to ask, for further information about what the heck is going on.
Thirdly, in the event that a step is not fully explained in any literature, a mathematician will have the creative mathematical abilities to handle solving it herself. But creating maths is a whole different kettle of fish from verifying it, so I won't go there.
How to recognise bad maths
All this doesn't really do much for the average Joe. When confronted with a piece of mathematics, "find a mathematician" may indeed be the best advice, but in situations where someone is trying to pull one over on you there often isn't time.
The classic example here is probably Intelligent Design, a variant of creationism. Its advocate, William Dembski, effectively attempts to reinvigorate the age-old Argument From Design by ruling out evolution as a source for much of the natural world. Say you got presented with one of Dembski's papers by a street preacher and was told "this paper proves God exists". How would one know that it was a fraud?
Fortunately, honestly mistaken maths differs greatly from actively misleading maths. In this case, the problem is obvious: the worst maths is no maths. If you read through Dembski's paper, you'll see that there's a mere handful of actual mathematical symbols per page, most of which are merely used to summarise Dembski's words rather than actually playing any part in proceedings.
This is a strong indicator that he's not actually proving very much. There are only two reasons for using words in a mathematical document: to explain stuff to students, and to pull the wool over people's eyes. Neither is appropriate for a mathematical paper. If you knew nothing about the mathematics in question, you'd still be able to spot this issue.
Further posts to come on this, when I'm feeling a little more coherent.
Read the full post
Mathematics is actually easier to understand than science to anyone with any knowledge of basic logical discourse. In principle, it's quite simple: choose a bunch of axioms whose truth defines your system, recombine them to produce other true statements, and gradually work your way up to the conclusion you were after.
This description is perfect, apart from one thing: no real mathematician actually bothers to do that. Over the years a methodology has emerged that's considerably more practical and is essentially equivalent to this idealised approach. So failure to conform to the ideal is not itself evidence of poor Quality.
All maths is trivial
There is a mathematical theorem, an an area known as propositional calculus, which says that all mathematical theorems are tautological. Now, they're using "tautological" in a far more rigorous sense than you or I, but the impression given by this quote is useful in other ways - it does convey a vaguely accurate perception of what's going on.
A mathematical proof exists as a set of definitions combined with a series of logical steps. The hard part for a non-mathematician is that the definitions may use prepackaged terms ("let X be the dihedral group D_2n, and Y a Sylow subgroup of order pm for m>1...") and the logic may skip large steps ("...then p divides n"). So in general it won't be possible for a non-mathematician to verify a proof without either learning a bit about the field or finding a helpful mathematician.
What would the mathematician do to verify the proof? Well, firstly, she would confirm she knew what all the definitions meant. Then she would go through the proof, figuring out which steps were obviously valid based on those definitions. Her response to the remaining few steps would be more interesting: she would break them down into smaller substeps.
This is where the "triviality" of mathematics comes into play. Large steps in logic are (in theory at least) mere shorthand for a whole bunch of shorter, more complex steps. So, for example, if I want to prove a differential equation I could use a giant step taken from the field of Fourier analysis. This would break down into smaller steps from the internal logic of the same field, which would effectively be huge steps taken from the field of complex analysis. These would break down into smaller steps from the field of naive set theory, which IIRC can be justified in terms of axiomatic set theory, and so on...
What value does being a mathematician have in this circumstance? Why couldn't a layman do this? There are three reasons. Firstly, the mathematician will generally have some hard-earned intuition about the objects being defined, and will be able to "verify" many of the steps by sheer instinct. She would be able to verify them by hand if necessary, but that's often just a massive waste of time.
Secondly, the mathematician will know where to look for information about the remaining steps. She will have some idea of which journals to check, which individuals to ask, for further information about what the heck is going on.
Thirdly, in the event that a step is not fully explained in any literature, a mathematician will have the creative mathematical abilities to handle solving it herself. But creating maths is a whole different kettle of fish from verifying it, so I won't go there.
How to recognise bad maths
All this doesn't really do much for the average Joe. When confronted with a piece of mathematics, "find a mathematician" may indeed be the best advice, but in situations where someone is trying to pull one over on you there often isn't time.
The classic example here is probably Intelligent Design, a variant of creationism. Its advocate, William Dembski, effectively attempts to reinvigorate the age-old Argument From Design by ruling out evolution as a source for much of the natural world. Say you got presented with one of Dembski's papers by a street preacher and was told "this paper proves God exists". How would one know that it was a fraud?
Fortunately, honestly mistaken maths differs greatly from actively misleading maths. In this case, the problem is obvious: the worst maths is no maths. If you read through Dembski's paper, you'll see that there's a mere handful of actual mathematical symbols per page, most of which are merely used to summarise Dembski's words rather than actually playing any part in proceedings.
This is a strong indicator that he's not actually proving very much. There are only two reasons for using words in a mathematical document: to explain stuff to students, and to pull the wool over people's eyes. Neither is appropriate for a mathematical paper. If you knew nothing about the mathematics in question, you'd still be able to spot this issue.
Further posts to come on this, when I'm feeling a little more coherent.
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Wednesday, November 01, 2006
What's with the "concrete" thing?
In a previous post on creationism, I used the word "concrete" when discussing the predictivity of scientific theories. What did I mean by that?
I gave one example of what a non-concrete prediction might look like. Many cranks have a habit of claiming that, since the dogmatic scientific community will be horribly undermined by their work, they're guaranteed to be laughed at. This prediction usually turns out to be true, which the crank claims supports a model of the world in which their notion is accurate and science is dogmatic.
Of course, the obvious response to this particular case is the infamous Carl Sagan quote: "They laughed at Columbus, they laughed at Fulton, they laughed at the Wright Brothers. But they also laughed at Bozo the Clown." However, there are some non-concrete claims that are less immediately laughable.
For example, many people present a variety of equally non-concrete evidences for God - a baby's smile, a sunset, a soaring bird. How, it's asked, can we see these things and not believe?
There are actually two answers to this. The more mundane one is that all this represents a rather impressive example of confirmation bias, the tendency to only remember half the story (in this case the good half). Incidentally, this form of bias is also the primary factor behind Murphy's law - it seems like toast always drops butter-side-down because, when it lands nicely, we don't feel annoyed enough to remember about it.
So, for example, the soaring bird is beautiful - but its subsequent evisceration by an unexpected hawk is less so. The baby's smile is lovely - but the other end of the baby is decidedly less pleasant. Sunsets can be gorgeous - until we recall that their vibrant colours are largely due to air pollution.
The second, more philosophically interesting, point is: it's not the baby, the sunset, the bird that's actually being offered as evidence. There is no logical progression from "baby smiles exist" to "God exists". What's really being presented as evidence is the intuitive beliefs that beauty exists and that beauty implies God.
Why can't we just accept that as scientifically useful? Because we have a long history of discovering that intuitive notions are wrong. The sky is not a big blue wall with holes in for rain and starlight. The Sun is not a small whizzy ball that spins round the Earth. Solid objects are actually probabilistic wavefunctions. Heck, space isn't even Euclidean. And yet, at various points in history, people have been sure of each of these to the point that expressing the opposite view would earn you a trip to the nuthouse*.
Given this repeated history of failure of "gut feel", why should the argument suddenly have far more credibility just because it's got the word "God" in it?
Disclaimer: as always, none of this means that God can't be considered real for an individual, or even real for the human species as a whole. It just means that the concept, as usually stated, doesn't necessarily meet the criteria to be considered real for any intelligent lifeform.
* In the case of the last two items on the list, these nuthouses still exist - they're called "universities"...
Read the full post
I gave one example of what a non-concrete prediction might look like. Many cranks have a habit of claiming that, since the dogmatic scientific community will be horribly undermined by their work, they're guaranteed to be laughed at. This prediction usually turns out to be true, which the crank claims supports a model of the world in which their notion is accurate and science is dogmatic.
Of course, the obvious response to this particular case is the infamous Carl Sagan quote: "They laughed at Columbus, they laughed at Fulton, they laughed at the Wright Brothers. But they also laughed at Bozo the Clown." However, there are some non-concrete claims that are less immediately laughable.
For example, many people present a variety of equally non-concrete evidences for God - a baby's smile, a sunset, a soaring bird. How, it's asked, can we see these things and not believe?
There are actually two answers to this. The more mundane one is that all this represents a rather impressive example of confirmation bias, the tendency to only remember half the story (in this case the good half). Incidentally, this form of bias is also the primary factor behind Murphy's law - it seems like toast always drops butter-side-down because, when it lands nicely, we don't feel annoyed enough to remember about it.
So, for example, the soaring bird is beautiful - but its subsequent evisceration by an unexpected hawk is less so. The baby's smile is lovely - but the other end of the baby is decidedly less pleasant. Sunsets can be gorgeous - until we recall that their vibrant colours are largely due to air pollution.
The second, more philosophically interesting, point is: it's not the baby, the sunset, the bird that's actually being offered as evidence. There is no logical progression from "baby smiles exist" to "God exists". What's really being presented as evidence is the intuitive beliefs that beauty exists and that beauty implies God.
Why can't we just accept that as scientifically useful? Because we have a long history of discovering that intuitive notions are wrong. The sky is not a big blue wall with holes in for rain and starlight. The Sun is not a small whizzy ball that spins round the Earth. Solid objects are actually probabilistic wavefunctions. Heck, space isn't even Euclidean. And yet, at various points in history, people have been sure of each of these to the point that expressing the opposite view would earn you a trip to the nuthouse*.
Given this repeated history of failure of "gut feel", why should the argument suddenly have far more credibility just because it's got the word "God" in it?
Disclaimer: as always, none of this means that God can't be considered real for an individual, or even real for the human species as a whole. It just means that the concept, as usually stated, doesn't necessarily meet the criteria to be considered real for any intelligent lifeform.
* In the case of the last two items on the list, these nuthouses still exist - they're called "universities"...
Read the full post
Hypothesis testing
Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.
- Richard Feynman
Reading list: Science as Falsification - Karl Popper
Back in the time of the Greeks, "science" as it existed then proceeded almost entirely by abstract thought. Needless to say, this was not always terribly effective - thought will simply tell you whether your model is consistent not whether it's accurate. As a result of these inadequacies, a new approach was developed called empiricism, which emphasised the importance of evidence.
But how to actually apply that evidence? With sufficient rationalisation, it's possible to make any data set fit any model - how to avoid the tendency to make ad hoc excuses?
The conclusion that scientists came to was very concordant with my thoughts on usefulness. They decided that the ultimate arbiter of truth (or at least of accuracy) would be the predictive power of an hypothesis. It may be possible to contort even as daft a notion as creationism to fit the evidence, but only at the expense of removing every last scrap of its predictive power.
Thus, the "hypothesis testing" approach was formalised. Generally it goes something like:
1) Find an area to study
2) Gather data from that area and look for patterns
3) Explicitly state an hypothesis
4) Derive concrete testable predictions from that hypothesis
5) Test the predictions
5a) If they're correct, go back to step 4 and carry on testing
5b) If they're incorrect, choose another hypothesis and go back to step 3
One thing you'll notice about this sequence is that there's no actual exit condition - there's no "6) Congratulations, your hypothesis is true". So how does the scientific community determine when an hypothesis is sufficiently well-tested? The threshold is inherently subjective here, but usually the scientific community eventually decides as a group that an hypothesis is firmly established enough to be taken as a given, at least provisionally.
Falsifiability
So far I've treated the scientific method as comparison of respective predictivities. There is, however, another paradigm worth considering: Popperian falsifiability.
Karl Popper's notion was that science proceeds by a process of weeding out the less accurate hypotheses. So, for example, Aristotle's theory of gravity was proven to be less accurate than Newton's, which was proven less accurate than Einstein's. This approach has two advantages: first, it provides a very precise linguistic framework for understanding these principles, and secondly, it throws up an interesting analogy.
The linguistic framework looks like this:
1) A conjecture is any claim about the universe
2) A falsifiable conjecture, aka an hypothesis, is one that can be disproven (i.e. "unicorns don't exist" could be disproven by finding a unicorn)
3) A verifiable conjecture is one that can be proven true (i.e. "unicorns exist" - the converse of a falsifiable conjecture is verifiable)
4) A testable conjecture, aka a prediction, is one that is both verifiable and falsifiable
The problem that science solves is: there is no way to demonstrate an hypothesis to be true. The solution is to stop worrying about truth and start worrying about accuracy. It's very easy to demonstrate an hypothesis accurate, by logically deriving predictions from it and testing them - in other words, by attempting to falsify them. Repeated failure to be falsified can be taken as a sign that an hypothesis is representative of the universe.
Now, one thing that's interesting to note is that this is directly equivalent to standard processes of biological evolution. In both cases, new variants of an object (DNA or hypotheses) are created pretty much at random, and the useful ones are retained whilst the less effective ones are discarded. Thus, the state of the scientific art tends towards a more accurate model of the universe, just as species tend towards a more efficient genome. In this sense, the goal of the scientific community is simply to create an environment in which the survival of an idea is proportional to its scientific usefulness.
Which is why scientists get so annoyed when politicians and preachers attempt to dictate reality by governmental fiat. But that's another issue.
(Oh, and: so much for my attempt to write in a more abbreviated style, huh?)
Read the full post
- Richard Feynman
Reading list: Science as Falsification - Karl Popper
Back in the time of the Greeks, "science" as it existed then proceeded almost entirely by abstract thought. Needless to say, this was not always terribly effective - thought will simply tell you whether your model is consistent not whether it's accurate. As a result of these inadequacies, a new approach was developed called empiricism, which emphasised the importance of evidence.
But how to actually apply that evidence? With sufficient rationalisation, it's possible to make any data set fit any model - how to avoid the tendency to make ad hoc excuses?
The conclusion that scientists came to was very concordant with my thoughts on usefulness. They decided that the ultimate arbiter of truth (or at least of accuracy) would be the predictive power of an hypothesis. It may be possible to contort even as daft a notion as creationism to fit the evidence, but only at the expense of removing every last scrap of its predictive power.
Thus, the "hypothesis testing" approach was formalised. Generally it goes something like:
1) Find an area to study
2) Gather data from that area and look for patterns
3) Explicitly state an hypothesis
4) Derive concrete testable predictions from that hypothesis
5) Test the predictions
5a) If they're correct, go back to step 4 and carry on testing
5b) If they're incorrect, choose another hypothesis and go back to step 3
One thing you'll notice about this sequence is that there's no actual exit condition - there's no "6) Congratulations, your hypothesis is true". So how does the scientific community determine when an hypothesis is sufficiently well-tested? The threshold is inherently subjective here, but usually the scientific community eventually decides as a group that an hypothesis is firmly established enough to be taken as a given, at least provisionally.
Falsifiability
So far I've treated the scientific method as comparison of respective predictivities. There is, however, another paradigm worth considering: Popperian falsifiability.
Karl Popper's notion was that science proceeds by a process of weeding out the less accurate hypotheses. So, for example, Aristotle's theory of gravity was proven to be less accurate than Newton's, which was proven less accurate than Einstein's. This approach has two advantages: first, it provides a very precise linguistic framework for understanding these principles, and secondly, it throws up an interesting analogy.
The linguistic framework looks like this:
1) A conjecture is any claim about the universe
2) A falsifiable conjecture, aka an hypothesis, is one that can be disproven (i.e. "unicorns don't exist" could be disproven by finding a unicorn)
3) A verifiable conjecture is one that can be proven true (i.e. "unicorns exist" - the converse of a falsifiable conjecture is verifiable)
4) A testable conjecture, aka a prediction, is one that is both verifiable and falsifiable
The problem that science solves is: there is no way to demonstrate an hypothesis to be true. The solution is to stop worrying about truth and start worrying about accuracy. It's very easy to demonstrate an hypothesis accurate, by logically deriving predictions from it and testing them - in other words, by attempting to falsify them. Repeated failure to be falsified can be taken as a sign that an hypothesis is representative of the universe.
Now, one thing that's interesting to note is that this is directly equivalent to standard processes of biological evolution. In both cases, new variants of an object (DNA or hypotheses) are created pretty much at random, and the useful ones are retained whilst the less effective ones are discarded. Thus, the state of the scientific art tends towards a more accurate model of the universe, just as species tend towards a more efficient genome. In this sense, the goal of the scientific community is simply to create an environment in which the survival of an idea is proportional to its scientific usefulness.
Which is why scientists get so annoyed when politicians and preachers attempt to dictate reality by governmental fiat. But that's another issue.
(Oh, and: so much for my attempt to write in a more abbreviated style, huh?)
Read the full post
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
All about the name
Recently someone asked me if my name meant I was pro-life. My reaction was along the lines of "what the... what are you... oh, I see what you mean. No."
I think the "embryo==human" stance of most pro-lifers is overly simplistic. This is due to my personal understanding that "me" is not some disembodied soul; it's a network of neurons firing in intricate patterns. This means there's no lightbulb moment where the embryo becomes human, so a more sophisticated approach is needed.
Going back to enlightened self-interest, a key reason to be anti-murder is that I could be next. As the "I" in question is a bunch of neurons, drawing the line at the start of humanlike neuronal activity makes sense - the embryo thinks, therefore it is.
If I recally correctly, that happens around the end of the second trimester, although adding a safety margin might be valid. I'm fairly sure that this doesn't qualify as "pro-life" by any normal definition... As a moral relativist, I'm open to reasoned debate on this.
Oh, and 'Lifewish' is just a really lame play on 'deathwish'.
Read the full post
I think the "embryo==human" stance of most pro-lifers is overly simplistic. This is due to my personal understanding that "me" is not some disembodied soul; it's a network of neurons firing in intricate patterns. This means there's no lightbulb moment where the embryo becomes human, so a more sophisticated approach is needed.
Going back to enlightened self-interest, a key reason to be anti-murder is that I could be next. As the "I" in question is a bunch of neurons, drawing the line at the start of humanlike neuronal activity makes sense - the embryo thinks, therefore it is.
If I recally correctly, that happens around the end of the second trimester, although adding a safety margin might be valid. I'm fairly sure that this doesn't qualify as "pro-life" by any normal definition... As a moral relativist, I'm open to reasoned debate on this.
Oh, and 'Lifewish' is just a really lame play on 'deathwish'.
Read the full post
Poor quality in action: my writing
You may have noticed that my writing uses a lot of words. This is a habit I've picked up debating - the more time one spends defining one's terms, the less easily people can creatively misunderstand them.
However, in standard blog posts, it's unnecessary and unreadable - poor quality. As such, it stops now.
...
You have no idea how hard it is not to extend that first paragraph, just to make sure people are clear what I'm saying...
Read the full post
However, in standard blog posts, it's unnecessary and unreadable - poor quality. As such, it stops now.
...
You have no idea how hard it is not to extend that first paragraph, just to make sure people are clear what I'm saying...
Read the full post
Usefulness v. truth
One thing that anyone who's actually bothered to read my posts on scientific usefulness may have noticed is: scientific usefulness and truth are not the same thing by a long shot. They cover a lot of the same ground, but there are things that fall into one and not the other.
For example, "emergent" phenomena like tornadoes are scientifically useful categorisations without being literally true. There is fundamentally no such thing as a tornado; it's just a label we apply to a really diverse array of air patterns. Useful but not true.
On the other hand, it would be possible for something to be true but not scientifically useful. For example, maybe there's a universe somewhere where Darth Vader really exists. If so, that would be true - but, since there'd be no way of having any contact of any sort with that universe, that truth would be completely useless.
However, there's another class of potentially true statements that are more problematic. These are statements that, if true, would be scientifically very useful, but that aren't testable - there's no way to tell whether they're true or false in advance. For example, if God exists and atheists really get sent to a big fiery pit after death, that would be very useful, but as yet no-one's come up with any experiment that could test for this.
We're getting into Pascal's Wager territory here - if these statements are potentially so significant, are we justified in ignoring them simply because we can't immediately assess their usefulness?
I would say yes. My rationale is that, by declaring these statements untestable, we're making it impossible to distinguish between them and the infinite number of other untestable statements that would counsel different behaviour. This is a classic refutation to Pascal's Wager - the possibility of a God that gets angry when people worship Him effectively cancels out the possibility of a God that gets angry when people don't. Until we find some way to test these statements, it's impossible to make useful decisions based on them - there are just too many conflicting options.
There's no little black box that will test the statements we feed it for truth. One could say that truth is not a useful concept, except insofar as it relates to predictivity. As far as predictivity is concerned, we do have such a little black box - and it's called science. That's as good as it gets, folks.
[Edit: on reflection, I think this cartoon said it better.]
Read the full post
For example, "emergent" phenomena like tornadoes are scientifically useful categorisations without being literally true. There is fundamentally no such thing as a tornado; it's just a label we apply to a really diverse array of air patterns. Useful but not true.
On the other hand, it would be possible for something to be true but not scientifically useful. For example, maybe there's a universe somewhere where Darth Vader really exists. If so, that would be true - but, since there'd be no way of having any contact of any sort with that universe, that truth would be completely useless.
However, there's another class of potentially true statements that are more problematic. These are statements that, if true, would be scientifically very useful, but that aren't testable - there's no way to tell whether they're true or false in advance. For example, if God exists and atheists really get sent to a big fiery pit after death, that would be very useful, but as yet no-one's come up with any experiment that could test for this.
We're getting into Pascal's Wager territory here - if these statements are potentially so significant, are we justified in ignoring them simply because we can't immediately assess their usefulness?
I would say yes. My rationale is that, by declaring these statements untestable, we're making it impossible to distinguish between them and the infinite number of other untestable statements that would counsel different behaviour. This is a classic refutation to Pascal's Wager - the possibility of a God that gets angry when people worship Him effectively cancels out the possibility of a God that gets angry when people don't. Until we find some way to test these statements, it's impossible to make useful decisions based on them - there are just too many conflicting options.
There's no little black box that will test the statements we feed it for truth. One could say that truth is not a useful concept, except insofar as it relates to predictivity. As far as predictivity is concerned, we do have such a little black box - and it's called science. That's as good as it gets, folks.
[Edit: on reflection, I think this cartoon said it better.]
Read the full post
To do list
I'm just going to make a brief list of stuff I need to cover at some point, so I don't forget it. This list is intended for my personal use, so don't expect much of it to make sense to you.
Note to self: go back through the archives, see if I can spot anything else.
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- Mental quality
- Components of the scientific method
- Recursive usefulness and paradox
- Components of the scientific method
- Social quality
- Dominance
- Body language
- Networking
- Dominance
- Physical quality
- Martial arts gunk
Note to self: go back through the archives, see if I can spot anything else.
Read the full post
Response to a comment
On another blog I commented that Christians seem highly reluctant to correct each other, and was promptly shown the error of my ways :)
The conversation is getting into issues of evolution/creationism, which I'd rather not contaminate another perfectly good blog with, so I'm proposing that such debate be moved over here. This is in response to my comment that believing in special creation of animals was counterfactual.
You might want to study the "Cambrian Explosion" in which all the phylla of large animals appear in a short period of time in the fossil record.
A few major responses here:
1) depending on one's definitions of "phyla" and "Cambrian explosion", only about 1/3 of the metazoan phyla appeared during this period.
2) when we talk about "phyla of large animals" the kind of large animals we're (presumably) talking about are small, jawless, boneless fish. Things like mammals, birds, reptiles etc came far far later. They weren't even like the fish we have today.
3) when we say "short" we mean "over 10 million years".
4) we actually have a few transitional fossils from within the Cambrian, which show (for example) how worms evolved from arthropods via lobopods.
Any thoughts?
Also, new studies of specific genomes are showing a much greater diversity between humans and other previously assumed "cousins" such as chimpanzees.
You'd have to point me at the studies. My understanding was that all they'd done was pinpointed the most changed and most conserved areas of the genome. The interesting thing about the approaches they're using for this is that they're based on comparing the rate of change in possibly useful areas to the rate of change in "junk" DNA. Thus, this approach would only be expected to produce useful results (which it has) if:
a) a majority of the "junk" DNA was actually pretty much useless
b) said junk DNA was inherited from a common ancestor
With the enormous amount of information found in the human genome, a 6% variation is now much greater than it was thought to be before.
I just finished a maths degree, so I'm legally required to call you on this: how are you defining "information" here? See, information theorists define it as the inverse log of the probability of an event - but, by this definition, randomly-selected events will generally have more information. Computer scientists define information as the compressibility of a string - but that's also greater for random strings. Randomness increases information. (Note: I can explain this in more detail if you wish)
If you have a new, rigorous definition, please share it. Or if you meant some less measurable concept of information, please elaborate. Otherwise, please be aware that the tendency to throw buzzwords like "information" into the conversation without defining them is one of the other things that I consider extremely daft.
There's a lot more to learn than the evolutionists lead on about. Their idea that they have it all figured out [a la Dawkins] reminds me more of the claims of the young earth creationists. One of my favorite Wittgenstein quotes, "what we do not know we must pass over in silence." Good advice for those bloviating about things they cannot verify.
I would note that the word "evolutionists" could be replaced with "quantum theorists" and that sentence would still make exactly the same amount of sense. It's not arrogance if you're right :)
Evolutionary biology is (in some areas at least) a predictive science. That's usually taken as an indicator that a science is at least broadly correct. There is no other predictive model of origins - if creationists were able to create one, they'd have done so by now. If you think evolutionists are so wrong, why not win a Nobel by producing one?
(Note: I haven't started listing predictions and evidences here, because I could... uh... "bloviate" for hours and still not have discussed all of them. If you're interested, ask.)
Disclaimer: I spend way too much time debating this stuff, and hence know most of the arguments inside out. Thus, even if I appear to come out ahead in this discussion, it might just mean that I know the talking points better.
Read the full post
The conversation is getting into issues of evolution/creationism, which I'd rather not contaminate another perfectly good blog with, so I'm proposing that such debate be moved over here. This is in response to my comment that believing in special creation of animals was counterfactual.
You might want to study the "Cambrian Explosion" in which all the phylla of large animals appear in a short period of time in the fossil record.
A few major responses here:
1) depending on one's definitions of "phyla" and "Cambrian explosion", only about 1/3 of the metazoan phyla appeared during this period.
2) when we talk about "phyla of large animals" the kind of large animals we're (presumably) talking about are small, jawless, boneless fish. Things like mammals, birds, reptiles etc came far far later. They weren't even like the fish we have today.
3) when we say "short" we mean "over 10 million years".
4) we actually have a few transitional fossils from within the Cambrian, which show (for example) how worms evolved from arthropods via lobopods.
Any thoughts?
Also, new studies of specific genomes are showing a much greater diversity between humans and other previously assumed "cousins" such as chimpanzees.
You'd have to point me at the studies. My understanding was that all they'd done was pinpointed the most changed and most conserved areas of the genome. The interesting thing about the approaches they're using for this is that they're based on comparing the rate of change in possibly useful areas to the rate of change in "junk" DNA. Thus, this approach would only be expected to produce useful results (which it has) if:
a) a majority of the "junk" DNA was actually pretty much useless
b) said junk DNA was inherited from a common ancestor
With the enormous amount of information found in the human genome, a 6% variation is now much greater than it was thought to be before.
I just finished a maths degree, so I'm legally required to call you on this: how are you defining "information" here? See, information theorists define it as the inverse log of the probability of an event - but, by this definition, randomly-selected events will generally have more information. Computer scientists define information as the compressibility of a string - but that's also greater for random strings. Randomness increases information. (Note: I can explain this in more detail if you wish)
If you have a new, rigorous definition, please share it. Or if you meant some less measurable concept of information, please elaborate. Otherwise, please be aware that the tendency to throw buzzwords like "information" into the conversation without defining them is one of the other things that I consider extremely daft.
There's a lot more to learn than the evolutionists lead on about. Their idea that they have it all figured out [a la Dawkins] reminds me more of the claims of the young earth creationists. One of my favorite Wittgenstein quotes, "what we do not know we must pass over in silence." Good advice for those bloviating about things they cannot verify.
I would note that the word "evolutionists" could be replaced with "quantum theorists" and that sentence would still make exactly the same amount of sense. It's not arrogance if you're right :)
Evolutionary biology is (in some areas at least) a predictive science. That's usually taken as an indicator that a science is at least broadly correct. There is no other predictive model of origins - if creationists were able to create one, they'd have done so by now. If you think evolutionists are so wrong, why not win a Nobel by producing one?
(Note: I haven't started listing predictions and evidences here, because I could... uh... "bloviate" for hours and still not have discussed all of them. If you're interested, ask.)
Disclaimer: I spend way too much time debating this stuff, and hence know most of the arguments inside out. Thus, even if I appear to come out ahead in this discussion, it might just mean that I know the talking points better.
Read the full post
Monday, October 30, 2006
What is science?
Science means many things to many people, but on closer examination it turns out that all the definitions are tightly interconnected. I need to hit the hay in a moment, so I'll briefly run through the stack and maybe comment more tomorrow.
Science is a goal. The goal of science, broadly speaking, is to improve our ability to understand and manipulate the universe. My preferred phrasing is that science attempts to find predictive models of how the world works.
Science is a method. It turns out that a particular pair of approaches (hypothesis testing and peer review), along with a bunch of handy if somewhat ad-hoc guidelines, turn out to be highly effective at helping us to achieve the scientific goal.
Science is a community. The scientific community is a group of people who subject their work to the rigours of the scientific method, with unparalleled success.
Science is a body of knowledge. Or, in my terms, a body of accurate predictive models. This is, of course, an incredibly useful thing to have. This body of knowledge is mostly produced by the scientific community because (more or less by definition) they have the most efficient ways of extending it.
It's important to get these definitions out of the way, because there's a certain amount of equivocation over the term due to these different levels. Each level is not equivalent to the others, but it can be legitimately assumed to be a good approximation thereof. Sometimes this approximation breaks, which is where you get "cargo cult science". More to come.
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Science is a goal. The goal of science, broadly speaking, is to improve our ability to understand and manipulate the universe. My preferred phrasing is that science attempts to find predictive models of how the world works.
Science is a method. It turns out that a particular pair of approaches (hypothesis testing and peer review), along with a bunch of handy if somewhat ad-hoc guidelines, turn out to be highly effective at helping us to achieve the scientific goal.
Science is a community. The scientific community is a group of people who subject their work to the rigours of the scientific method, with unparalleled success.
Science is a body of knowledge. Or, in my terms, a body of accurate predictive models. This is, of course, an incredibly useful thing to have. This body of knowledge is mostly produced by the scientific community because (more or less by definition) they have the most efficient ways of extending it.
It's important to get these definitions out of the way, because there's a certain amount of equivocation over the term due to these different levels. Each level is not equivalent to the others, but it can be legitimately assumed to be a good approximation thereof. Sometimes this approximation breaks, which is where you get "cargo cult science". More to come.
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Why believe in God?
A couple of posts ago, I promised a discussion of what I felt were legitimate reasons to believe in God despite the lack of scientific usefulness in the concept. However, on reading my own archives, I realised that I'd already covered a lot of what I wanted to say. However, I would like to recap briefly, to put these things in the new context of usefulness.
Before I start, I'd like to make a general statement. A lot of these reasons for believing in God appear at first glance to be extremely derogatory. They're not. They're useful. The reason that people look at them and think "oh, you're soooo mean" is that it's been drummed into them for years that these other forms of usefulness are intrinsically of less value than scientific usefulness.
My feeling is that this is the cause of a lot of grief, and of travesties like Intelligent Design. People believe in God for these other legitimate reasons, but feel slightly silly for doing so and thus try to validate that belief in terms of scientific usefulness, which only causes unnecessary confusion.
Use 1: happiness
Conserved component: anything that makes one immediately happy is (in general) useful.
Many religious beliefs certainly fall into this category. The reassurance that these beliefs provide can be an incredibly powerful force when an individual is feeling out of control of their life. Read Sara Robinson on fundamentalism for further discussion of the connection between stress and religion.
Use 2: motivation
Conserved component: anything that makes one more motivated is (in general) useful.
Although in this area there's nothing special about religion per se, for some individuals it appears to be very motivating - certainly qualifying as useful for them (although not necessarily for humanity as a whole).
Use 3: mental efficiency
Conserved component: anything that makes one more efficient is (in general) useful.
Let's face it: there are some things that it's not really worth wasting a lot of time discussing. You'll never figure out an answer to the meaning of life in an online debate, so why waste that time when you could be off making the most of said life?
However, this is harder than it sounds because humans have built-in drives to seek out new knowledge (and, I suspect, to argue incessantly about it...). The statement "Goddidit" is useless from a scientific perspective because it works in every possible circumstances - but, from an action-based perspective, closing off those channels of thought can be extremely useful, and God makes a wonderful cork to keep these particular genies in their bottles.
I suspect this is what Ken Miller means when he says "I find that the hypothesis of God helps me to make sense of life and of the world around me, and I find that hypothesis congruent with science, not dependent upon it", although he would almost certainly disagree with my characterisation. Religion can provide a useful framework in that it helps one to focus more tightly on individual issues without being distracted by the scenery.
Use 4: socialisation
Conserved component: anything that makes one more easily able to gain the respect of one's peers is (in general) useful.
For this particular subset of usefulness, it's not actually necessary to believe in God, only to give the appearance thereof. And this is certainly what many people do... However, in many of the more evangelistic communities, it's getting ever harder to just pretend - eventually your mask will probably slip. In this sense, the belief itself, rather than merely the impression of it, could be considered useful.
Use 5: transmission of wisdom
Conserved component: accurate guidelines for effective living are pretty damn useful.
This almost certainly used to be one of the major reasons for religion, as anyone who's read Psalms can guess, and for many religions it's still a key component. However, in an age where any idiot can give advice, it's hard to give a good reason why merely having existed for a few thousand years means scriptural advice will be any better than that from other sources. I guess that selective effects would be expected to weed out some of the dross, though.
Thanks to the good folk at the interfaith society for pointing me towards this use, which I honestly hadn't really considered before. Maybe for some traditions it's even true.
So what's with the atheism?
So, if there are all these convincing reasons to believe (and I'm sure I've just scratched the surface), why do I not believe? Well, my feeling is that, as of now, the price is not right. I'm not in major need of comfort, I seriously doubt that belief in God will get me off my ass, I have no hopes that I could satisfy my rampant curiosity with "Goddidit", and my social life is actually doing quite well on its own (the main limiting factor is ineptness rather than beliefs!). Whilst I'm certainly in need of wisdom, I have doubts that the Abrahamic religions would be good teachers for me. Possibly I should try Buddhism, but that's completely compatible with atheism.
To my mind, the negative usefulness conveyed by religion's lack of scientific usefulness easily overwhelms these marginal advantages. Not particularly because I think the small reduction in predictivity would be a deal-killer, but because I worry that it wouldn't stop there. Religious belief can eat rationality alive. And that gives rise to a fundamental paradox which... but that's a post for another day.
I'll leave you with another reason for religion, which I couldn't quite figure out how to work into the preceding list. Say hi to the cutest religion analogy ever!
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Before I start, I'd like to make a general statement. A lot of these reasons for believing in God appear at first glance to be extremely derogatory. They're not. They're useful. The reason that people look at them and think "oh, you're soooo mean" is that it's been drummed into them for years that these other forms of usefulness are intrinsically of less value than scientific usefulness.
My feeling is that this is the cause of a lot of grief, and of travesties like Intelligent Design. People believe in God for these other legitimate reasons, but feel slightly silly for doing so and thus try to validate that belief in terms of scientific usefulness, which only causes unnecessary confusion.
Use 1: happiness
Conserved component: anything that makes one immediately happy is (in general) useful.
Many religious beliefs certainly fall into this category. The reassurance that these beliefs provide can be an incredibly powerful force when an individual is feeling out of control of their life. Read Sara Robinson on fundamentalism for further discussion of the connection between stress and religion.
Use 2: motivation
Conserved component: anything that makes one more motivated is (in general) useful.
Although in this area there's nothing special about religion per se, for some individuals it appears to be very motivating - certainly qualifying as useful for them (although not necessarily for humanity as a whole).
Use 3: mental efficiency
Conserved component: anything that makes one more efficient is (in general) useful.
Let's face it: there are some things that it's not really worth wasting a lot of time discussing. You'll never figure out an answer to the meaning of life in an online debate, so why waste that time when you could be off making the most of said life?
However, this is harder than it sounds because humans have built-in drives to seek out new knowledge (and, I suspect, to argue incessantly about it...). The statement "Goddidit" is useless from a scientific perspective because it works in every possible circumstances - but, from an action-based perspective, closing off those channels of thought can be extremely useful, and God makes a wonderful cork to keep these particular genies in their bottles.
I suspect this is what Ken Miller means when he says "I find that the hypothesis of God helps me to make sense of life and of the world around me, and I find that hypothesis congruent with science, not dependent upon it", although he would almost certainly disagree with my characterisation. Religion can provide a useful framework in that it helps one to focus more tightly on individual issues without being distracted by the scenery.
Use 4: socialisation
Conserved component: anything that makes one more easily able to gain the respect of one's peers is (in general) useful.
For this particular subset of usefulness, it's not actually necessary to believe in God, only to give the appearance thereof. And this is certainly what many people do... However, in many of the more evangelistic communities, it's getting ever harder to just pretend - eventually your mask will probably slip. In this sense, the belief itself, rather than merely the impression of it, could be considered useful.
Use 5: transmission of wisdom
Conserved component: accurate guidelines for effective living are pretty damn useful.
This almost certainly used to be one of the major reasons for religion, as anyone who's read Psalms can guess, and for many religions it's still a key component. However, in an age where any idiot can give advice, it's hard to give a good reason why merely having existed for a few thousand years means scriptural advice will be any better than that from other sources. I guess that selective effects would be expected to weed out some of the dross, though.
Thanks to the good folk at the interfaith society for pointing me towards this use, which I honestly hadn't really considered before. Maybe for some traditions it's even true.
So what's with the atheism?
So, if there are all these convincing reasons to believe (and I'm sure I've just scratched the surface), why do I not believe? Well, my feeling is that, as of now, the price is not right. I'm not in major need of comfort, I seriously doubt that belief in God will get me off my ass, I have no hopes that I could satisfy my rampant curiosity with "Goddidit", and my social life is actually doing quite well on its own (the main limiting factor is ineptness rather than beliefs!). Whilst I'm certainly in need of wisdom, I have doubts that the Abrahamic religions would be good teachers for me. Possibly I should try Buddhism, but that's completely compatible with atheism.
To my mind, the negative usefulness conveyed by religion's lack of scientific usefulness easily overwhelms these marginal advantages. Not particularly because I think the small reduction in predictivity would be a deal-killer, but because I worry that it wouldn't stop there. Religious belief can eat rationality alive. And that gives rise to a fundamental paradox which... but that's a post for another day.
I'll leave you with another reason for religion, which I couldn't quite figure out how to work into the preceding list. Say hi to the cutest religion analogy ever!
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Quality Quickies
One habit I've picked up recently is: every time I've been doing something that gives me new experiences, I make a list of issues to watch out for. That way, the next time I hit that situation I can do a better job.
I'm going to start publishing some of my collection under the title Quality Quickies. I'm aware that that could be hideously misinterpreted - it's all part of a cunning plan to push up my blog's hitcount >:)
The following nuggets were collected the first time I attempted this approach, halfway through a summer internship, after a particularly, um, eventful day. Enjoy.
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I'm going to start publishing some of my collection under the title Quality Quickies. I'm aware that that could be hideously misinterpreted - it's all part of a cunning plan to push up my blog's hitcount >:)
The following nuggets were collected the first time I attempted this approach, halfway through a summer internship, after a particularly, um, eventful day. Enjoy.
- Keep an eye out for things that are more likely than usual to go wrong. For example, if a 2 hour train journey took you four hours yesterday night due to buggered tracks, expect the same train journey to take some time today too.
- If your boss wants you to keep in touch in any way, do not leave the building without a working, powered, paid-up mobile.
- Best to get a signature for deliveries unless otherwise specified.
- If you find that you're wasting work time online, kill your browser. No excuses.
- Make sure you know where the project you're working on is supposed to be going, that way you can more effectively help it get there.
- When working on computer-killing programs, make sure you have something else to do before running the damn thing.
- Don't drink more than (at absolute most) two pints the night before you have to be in work. And don't mix wine and beer - they're not exaggerating about the effects of that.
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Sunday, October 29, 2006
What moral relativism means to me
(Disclaimer: I'm probably using the term "moral relativism" in a non-standard fashion. So sue me.)
I mentioned before that scientific knowledge acted as a very strongly-conserved component of the more general idea of usefulness. I'd like to throw a little light on another conserved component: enlightened self-interest.
ESI is the basis on which rationalists make moral decisions. The basic principle is simple - in order to achieve one's personal goals, it is useful to support a society in which achieving those goals is easy. If you enjoy walking in the midst of unspoiled nature, don't leave crisp packets behind you. If you aim to get fit through a swimming regime, don't piss in the pool. If you want people to be nice to you, be nice to them, and encourage them to be nice to each other.
This bears some resemblance to the Broken Windows approach to crime prevention - even small acts of personal responsibility can help create an environment that is far more enjoyable and/or effective. Likewise, exhibiting sociopathic or psychopathic behaviour (as many theists seem to believe atheists should) results in a very poor-Quality environment. We're all in the same boat - it's daft to drill holes in the bottom.
Why does this differ from absolute morality? Because the path of greatest ESI may vary between different times and places. To take the classic example: lying is not wrong when you've got Jews hiding in your cellar and the Nazis knocking on the door and asking if you've seen them. It's possible to imagine situations in which any "sin" could actually be the best thing to do in order to create a better environment. ESI morality is a means to that end, not an end in itself.
Obviously it's impossible to argue that absolute morality is immoral, because moral systems can only be evaluated in terms of other moral systems. However, I feel I can make a fairly strong case that absolute morality is extremely counterproductive. It makes reasoned debate impossible and causes concrete harm to individuals worldwide who have either a relative morality or merely a different absolute morality to those in power.
A recent example of where absolute morality can lead us is the case of the Australian Imam who raised outrage worldwide by claiming that unveiled women were like "uncovered meat", and were therefore at least partially responsible for acts of sexual violence perpetrated against them. As explanations go, that one is quite blatantly complete bollocks. It's fairly clear that the Imam merely had some a priori, morally absolute idea that it was good for women to be veiled, and sought to justify that in more rational terms.
What has got fewer column inches is the fact that his behaviour here was actually an improvement over the norm. In most theocracies, authorities don't even bother with faking up a rational explanation for why something is bad. The fact that it is Written would be enough - off with his head. Again this seems to be a particular problem for Islam - the specific issue that springs to mind is its injunction to kill apostates, which is quite frankly idiotic from the point of view of any of the goals that Islam claims to prioritise.
Absolute morality just is. You can't argue with it. You can't point out why it's stupid or mistaken or unhelpful, because all of that is beside the point - the morality is the important thing, and we humans are merely the protagonists or antagonists of Its justice. As I said before, I obviously can't prove that to be morally wrong. However, I think I'm justified in saying that, at least to me, it's an extremely scary concept.
Moral relativism, to me, means that our decisions are made with respect not to some calcified set of semi-arbitrary rules but with respect to the impact those decisions will have on our fellow human beings and, ultimately, ourselves. It means that we can be reasoned out of behaving badly, and reasoned into behaving in a way that benefits society. It means that, when something freaks us out, we actually have to come up with good reasons as to why it's wrong rather than simply turning to the nearest bigoted Holy Book*.
Whilst, as a moral relativist, it's impossible for me to say that moral relativism is good in all circumstances, I think it's fair to say that ESI is a useful approach in the overwhelming majority of cases, qualifying easily for Conserved Component status.
* I was chatting to a very nice (Christian) girl this evening who is going to have major problems with this when she tells her (extremely religious) parents that she's gay. A decent proportion of the public seem never to have learned that "yuck" does not constitute a valid moral argument.
Read the full post
I mentioned before that scientific knowledge acted as a very strongly-conserved component of the more general idea of usefulness. I'd like to throw a little light on another conserved component: enlightened self-interest.
ESI is the basis on which rationalists make moral decisions. The basic principle is simple - in order to achieve one's personal goals, it is useful to support a society in which achieving those goals is easy. If you enjoy walking in the midst of unspoiled nature, don't leave crisp packets behind you. If you aim to get fit through a swimming regime, don't piss in the pool. If you want people to be nice to you, be nice to them, and encourage them to be nice to each other.
This bears some resemblance to the Broken Windows approach to crime prevention - even small acts of personal responsibility can help create an environment that is far more enjoyable and/or effective. Likewise, exhibiting sociopathic or psychopathic behaviour (as many theists seem to believe atheists should) results in a very poor-Quality environment. We're all in the same boat - it's daft to drill holes in the bottom.
Why does this differ from absolute morality? Because the path of greatest ESI may vary between different times and places. To take the classic example: lying is not wrong when you've got Jews hiding in your cellar and the Nazis knocking on the door and asking if you've seen them. It's possible to imagine situations in which any "sin" could actually be the best thing to do in order to create a better environment. ESI morality is a means to that end, not an end in itself.
Obviously it's impossible to argue that absolute morality is immoral, because moral systems can only be evaluated in terms of other moral systems. However, I feel I can make a fairly strong case that absolute morality is extremely counterproductive. It makes reasoned debate impossible and causes concrete harm to individuals worldwide who have either a relative morality or merely a different absolute morality to those in power.
A recent example of where absolute morality can lead us is the case of the Australian Imam who raised outrage worldwide by claiming that unveiled women were like "uncovered meat", and were therefore at least partially responsible for acts of sexual violence perpetrated against them. As explanations go, that one is quite blatantly complete bollocks. It's fairly clear that the Imam merely had some a priori, morally absolute idea that it was good for women to be veiled, and sought to justify that in more rational terms.
What has got fewer column inches is the fact that his behaviour here was actually an improvement over the norm. In most theocracies, authorities don't even bother with faking up a rational explanation for why something is bad. The fact that it is Written would be enough - off with his head. Again this seems to be a particular problem for Islam - the specific issue that springs to mind is its injunction to kill apostates, which is quite frankly idiotic from the point of view of any of the goals that Islam claims to prioritise.
Absolute morality just is. You can't argue with it. You can't point out why it's stupid or mistaken or unhelpful, because all of that is beside the point - the morality is the important thing, and we humans are merely the protagonists or antagonists of Its justice. As I said before, I obviously can't prove that to be morally wrong. However, I think I'm justified in saying that, at least to me, it's an extremely scary concept.
Moral relativism, to me, means that our decisions are made with respect not to some calcified set of semi-arbitrary rules but with respect to the impact those decisions will have on our fellow human beings and, ultimately, ourselves. It means that we can be reasoned out of behaving badly, and reasoned into behaving in a way that benefits society. It means that, when something freaks us out, we actually have to come up with good reasons as to why it's wrong rather than simply turning to the nearest bigoted Holy Book*.
Whilst, as a moral relativist, it's impossible for me to say that moral relativism is good in all circumstances, I think it's fair to say that ESI is a useful approach in the overwhelming majority of cases, qualifying easily for Conserved Component status.
* I was chatting to a very nice (Christian) girl this evening who is going to have major problems with this when she tells her (extremely religious) parents that she's gay. A decent proportion of the public seem never to have learned that "yuck" does not constitute a valid moral argument.
Read the full post
Lapsed atheists
One of the more amusing comments at the interfaith meeting mentioned in my last post was one theist's comment that he, along with many others present there, was a "lapsed atheist". On reflection, this was probably directed at the Christian panelist, who was a Roman Catholic, and the Humanist panelist, who had been gently ranting about inability to get off the RC church's membership rolls. It's an amusing concept - one doesn't normally think of a theist as being an apostate atheist.
It did get me thinking, though: what motivates people to ditch atheism? In some ways, atheism is the least stable religious position - you only need one solitary bit of hard evidence to be justified in dropping it. Have lapsed atheists acquired some strong new scientific evidence that I've yet to stumble across? Or have they simply renounced membership of the reality-based community in favour of a viewpoint that they personally find more effective? I'm guessing the latter, but I'd be interested to know for sure.
The problem is that I currently don't know any lapsed atheists, at least not that I'm aware of. Can any of my theistic readers* help me out here?
* I realise I'm making a rather large assumption here that anyone out there actually reads my blog... However, if I'm wrong, no-one will notice, so I might as well take the chance. It's all a matter of usefulness :)
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It did get me thinking, though: what motivates people to ditch atheism? In some ways, atheism is the least stable religious position - you only need one solitary bit of hard evidence to be justified in dropping it. Have lapsed atheists acquired some strong new scientific evidence that I've yet to stumble across? Or have they simply renounced membership of the reality-based community in favour of a viewpoint that they personally find more effective? I'm guessing the latter, but I'd be interested to know for sure.
The problem is that I currently don't know any lapsed atheists, at least not that I'm aware of. Can any of my theistic readers* help me out here?
* I realise I'm making a rather large assumption here that anyone out there actually reads my blog... However, if I'm wrong, no-one will notice, so I might as well take the chance. It's all a matter of usefulness :)
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Religion done right
I just spent the afternoon at a meeting of the local interfaith society, which was arranged as a panel discussion between various denominations - Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish and (to my surprise) Humanist. I was somewhat shocked to find that I agreed with almost everything that was said.
Recently I've been feeling my way towards a new philosophy, based on notions analogous to Quality albeit somewhat more pragmatic in tone, which defines reality in terms of beliefs which are useful. We can then draw a distinction between consensual reality (the beliefs that are real for all humans) and personal reality (subjective "truths").
This has theusefulconvenient feature that it provides a concise explanation for the importance of science. Science is based around a particular subset of usefulness: an idea is scientifically useful if it gives rise to a more predictive understanding of the universe. This scientific usefulness has the unique property of applying to pretty much any intelligent lifeform that could exist (with a scant few pathological examples). Not just to certain individuals, not just to humanity as a whole - any intelligent lifeform, whatever its goals in life, will be more able to achieve those goals if it can accurately assess what future circumstances will be. As such, concepts conforming to this version of usefulness can be legitimately treated as part of an objective reality, regardless of their actual material existence.
Note: this also provides a nice refutation of the all-too-common claim that atheism cannot be true because if it were there would be no reason for us to be able to accurately perceive our environment. It is quite clear that, in general, it will be of value to an organism to accurately perceive its environment - as that is a prerequisite for predicting what its environment will do next - and so such a trait would be an extremely plausible evolutionary outcome.
Consensual reality is slightly more expansive than scientific reality - at present, it also incorporates concepts that are useful to all humans, but that might not be useful to martians (if we ever met any martians, we might have to re-evaluate this...). For example, "soft sciences" such as project management or psychotherapy apply to anyone with a human-like mind, but might not be useful for (picking a random example) a hive species.
This redefinition moves the philosophical battleground of theism from the question of whether God is real to the question of whether He is real for all lifeforms, or "just" all humans, or simply a subset thereof. This is where the concept of usefulness comes into its own as a model of human behaviour, as we can then start to analyse all the other ways in which a statement might be useful, with a concept's reality for an individual being a weighted average. It's also a significantly more tractable question than whether God "exists" in any more materialistic sense. As you're probably aware, my belief is that God is not real in this sense - I am, of course, open to discussion here.
This brings us back to the interfaith talk, because it was quite apparent that most of the participants were talking less about whether their beliefs were objectively (scientifically) true than whether their beliefs were subjectively useful.
Of particular note were the Hindu Swami and the Jewish Rabbi. The Swami focused almost entirely on religion as a means of spiritual development, a set of useful markers and methods to help us along the path of personal growth (this theme was also echoed, albeit with rather less vigour, by the Christian on the panel). In this sense, religion is "merely" a handy guide, a set of well-trodden roads that people have laid down over the centuries, with no need to be objectively real. The Rabbi focused on the standard gunk - religion as bringer of morality etc - but was unusual in that she expressly stated that this was true for her, and might not apply to someone else. IMO that's a far more respectable stance on this question than the usual one, and I found it very refreshing.
Is God objectively real? As far as I can tell, the answer is no. Is God real for some individuals? Apparently so, and I hope to explore further why this should be the case. Is God part of consensual reality? At present I'd say no, but I'll need to examine this question in future posts.
In light of this reformulation, how does one define the reality-based community, the faith-based community and the action-based community? What's the most effective combination of these to live by, and why?
Watch this space, folks. And visit any interfaith events in your area, they're bloody marvellous.
Read the full post
Recently I've been feeling my way towards a new philosophy, based on notions analogous to Quality albeit somewhat more pragmatic in tone, which defines reality in terms of beliefs which are useful. We can then draw a distinction between consensual reality (the beliefs that are real for all humans) and personal reality (subjective "truths").
This has the
Note: this also provides a nice refutation of the all-too-common claim that atheism cannot be true because if it were there would be no reason for us to be able to accurately perceive our environment. It is quite clear that, in general, it will be of value to an organism to accurately perceive its environment - as that is a prerequisite for predicting what its environment will do next - and so such a trait would be an extremely plausible evolutionary outcome.
Consensual reality is slightly more expansive than scientific reality - at present, it also incorporates concepts that are useful to all humans, but that might not be useful to martians (if we ever met any martians, we might have to re-evaluate this...). For example, "soft sciences" such as project management or psychotherapy apply to anyone with a human-like mind, but might not be useful for (picking a random example) a hive species.
This redefinition moves the philosophical battleground of theism from the question of whether God is real to the question of whether He is real for all lifeforms, or "just" all humans, or simply a subset thereof. This is where the concept of usefulness comes into its own as a model of human behaviour, as we can then start to analyse all the other ways in which a statement might be useful, with a concept's reality for an individual being a weighted average. It's also a significantly more tractable question than whether God "exists" in any more materialistic sense. As you're probably aware, my belief is that God is not real in this sense - I am, of course, open to discussion here.
This brings us back to the interfaith talk, because it was quite apparent that most of the participants were talking less about whether their beliefs were objectively (scientifically) true than whether their beliefs were subjectively useful.
Of particular note were the Hindu Swami and the Jewish Rabbi. The Swami focused almost entirely on religion as a means of spiritual development, a set of useful markers and methods to help us along the path of personal growth (this theme was also echoed, albeit with rather less vigour, by the Christian on the panel). In this sense, religion is "merely" a handy guide, a set of well-trodden roads that people have laid down over the centuries, with no need to be objectively real. The Rabbi focused on the standard gunk - religion as bringer of morality etc - but was unusual in that she expressly stated that this was true for her, and might not apply to someone else. IMO that's a far more respectable stance on this question than the usual one, and I found it very refreshing.
Is God objectively real? As far as I can tell, the answer is no. Is God real for some individuals? Apparently so, and I hope to explore further why this should be the case. Is God part of consensual reality? At present I'd say no, but I'll need to examine this question in future posts.
In light of this reformulation, how does one define the reality-based community, the faith-based community and the action-based community? What's the most effective combination of these to live by, and why?
Watch this space, folks. And visit any interfaith events in your area, they're bloody marvellous.
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Tuesday, October 24, 2006
A challenge to creationists
I'm being very lazy about the Protein Challenge at the moment, due to a combination of general lassitude and complete lack of any idea as to where to start. I will get onto it, especially since the issues raised seem to be flaring up again over on Paul's blog (he's doing a series on Dembski's design inference and specification).
In the meantime, here's another money-where-mouth-is challenge to those of you out there who have very different beliefs to me in the area of origins.
Science and predictivity
A scientific model (a hypothesis or group of hypotheses) is said to be predictive if it tells us the results of experiments that we haven't performed yet. For example, the model of quantum mechanics tells us how electrons will behave in various potentials without our actually having to generate those potentials and throw electrons at them.
It's fair to say that predictive models are the holy grail of science. These perfect crystal balls, these insights into the future, justify the entire enterprise - they are what makes science so unbelievably useful.
Evolution and predictivity
Evolution has been the only model that accurately fitted all the data for over a century now. However, it's theoretically possible to create any number of models to fit a given set of data (although currently the only alternatives are very heavy on the Goddidits), so that in itself is not conclusive evidence for evolution.
What is conclusive evidence that evolution is at least on the right lines is the large number of confirmed predictions that evolution has made. For example:
Neither of these facts were predicted by any other models that existed at the time.
The Challenge
The challenge is aimed at anyone who claims that creationism, or any other alternative origins conjecture, has scientific merit. Simply provide me with one valid prediction that your model has produced. If you can do this, I'll publicly declare that your model is scientific, and devote the next month or so of my life to figuring out
The conditions
Some of the following criteria for what constitutes a "valid prediction" will border on the insulting to the more honest of you, but I've seen people argue each of these points so it's best to get things out in the open. The criteria I'm concerned with are:
Disclaimer: I reserve the right to modify these criteria if someone comes up with some really really daft workaround that I hadn't thought of, but I solemnly swear that this will only be done in absolutely exceptional circumstances.
These criteria are not excessive - both of the evolutionary predictions I discussed above pass with flying colours. These criteria are not ad-hoc - each and every point is essential to proper scientific hypothesis testing. I'm currently fairly sure that these criteria, rigorously enforced, are sufficient to confirm that a model is at least broadly accurate.
Before anyone asks, emotional arguments, or logical arguments not relating to hypothesis testing, will not be accepted for the purposes of this challenge.
No, I would accept the evidence
One response that I've heard in a variety of contexts is "you're an atheist, you wouldn't accept the evidence even if we gave it to you". This is factually inaccurate.
I self-define primarily as a member of the reality-based community. Although, at present, most RBCers are atheists, this is for strictly pragmatic reasons rather than any sort of underlying resistance to any given brand of theism. In short, if you provide me with the evidence, I will accept your hypothesis as being more accurate in this area than the mainstream scientific consensus (if one exists in that area).
Read the full post
In the meantime, here's another money-where-mouth-is challenge to those of you out there who have very different beliefs to me in the area of origins.
Science and predictivity
A scientific model (a hypothesis or group of hypotheses) is said to be predictive if it tells us the results of experiments that we haven't performed yet. For example, the model of quantum mechanics tells us how electrons will behave in various potentials without our actually having to generate those potentials and throw electrons at them.
It's fair to say that predictive models are the holy grail of science. These perfect crystal balls, these insights into the future, justify the entire enterprise - they are what makes science so unbelievably useful.
Evolution and predictivity
Evolution has been the only model that accurately fitted all the data for over a century now. However, it's theoretically possible to create any number of models to fit a given set of data (although currently the only alternatives are very heavy on the Goddidits), so that in itself is not conclusive evidence for evolution.
What is conclusive evidence that evolution is at least on the right lines is the large number of confirmed predictions that evolution has made. For example:
- When the genomes of the great apes (inc. humans) were first studied, it was observed that humans had one chromosome per gamete less than any of their closest relatives. As humans were unique in this respect, it was hypothesised that having one more chromosome was the ancestral condition. It was known at the time that it is nigh-on impossible to just lose a chromosome, hence it was hypothesised that at some point in the human lineage two chromosomes must have fused. It was therefore predicted that one human chromosome would look exactly like two fused chimp chromosomes. This prediction was later confirmed.
- It's been known for a long time that primates are unable to produce vitamin C (chemical name: L-ascorbic acid). Since most mammals can, it was hypothesised that this was the ancestral condition, and that primates have subsequently lost that ability. With the emergence of population genetics, it became apparent that, in this case, remnants of the vitC gene should exist in primates - these pseudogenes wouldn't have had time to fade away. Hence it was predicted that primate genomes would contain DNA strings very similar to those used to produce vitC in other mammals. This prediction was later confirmed
Neither of these facts were predicted by any other models that existed at the time.
The Challenge
The challenge is aimed at anyone who claims that creationism, or any other alternative origins conjecture, has scientific merit. Simply provide me with one valid prediction that your model has produced. If you can do this, I'll publicly declare that your model is scientific, and devote the next month or so of my life to figuring out
The conditions
Some of the following criteria for what constitutes a "valid prediction" will border on the insulting to the more honest of you, but I've seen people argue each of these points so it's best to get things out in the open. The criteria I'm concerned with are:
- It must be new knowledge - it can't be something we already knew to be true at the time the prediction was made. "Predicting" the existence of the universe doesn't qualify.
- It must be concrete, i.e. relating to the physical universe - sociological predictions derived from physical models will not generally be accepted. Predicting that people will be picky about your model doesn't qualify.
- It must be testable, i.e. both verifiable and falsifiable. "Predicting" that evolution won't be able to explain something doesn't qualify, as that conjecture is falsifiable but not verifiable (it's actually an hypothesis). Note: "predictions" that are verifiable but not falsifiable may be accepted as a weaker evidence for your model.
- It must be unique to your model - so no predictions that would also be made by current mainstream scientific models. Predicting that the sun will come up tomorrow doesn't qualify.
- It must be confirmed. Predicting something that hasn't actually been tested yet doesn't qualify.
- It must follow inevitably from the model. Conjecturing that God exists and hence predicting that Mars will have subterranean water will not qualify unless you provide a damn good rationale. Throwing out thousands of mutually-conflicting conjectures and hoping one will stick is also not acceptable.
- It must be checkable - I must be able to confirm that all the other criteria hold. For this reason, predictions older than 50 years will not in general be accepted.
Disclaimer: I reserve the right to modify these criteria if someone comes up with some really really daft workaround that I hadn't thought of, but I solemnly swear that this will only be done in absolutely exceptional circumstances.
These criteria are not excessive - both of the evolutionary predictions I discussed above pass with flying colours. These criteria are not ad-hoc - each and every point is essential to proper scientific hypothesis testing. I'm currently fairly sure that these criteria, rigorously enforced, are sufficient to confirm that a model is at least broadly accurate.
Before anyone asks, emotional arguments, or logical arguments not relating to hypothesis testing, will not be accepted for the purposes of this challenge.
No, I would accept the evidence
One response that I've heard in a variety of contexts is "you're an atheist, you wouldn't accept the evidence even if we gave it to you". This is factually inaccurate.
I self-define primarily as a member of the reality-based community. Although, at present, most RBCers are atheists, this is for strictly pragmatic reasons rather than any sort of underlying resistance to any given brand of theism. In short, if you provide me with the evidence, I will accept your hypothesis as being more accurate in this area than the mainstream scientific consensus (if one exists in that area).
Read the full post
Wednesday, September 20, 2006
The joys of jobhunting
Today I had the interview (flowerily termed an "assessment centre") for the company I mentioned previously. Thought it went quite well, although the other applicants were scarily good.
Actually, it was the most challenging interview process that I've had yet - and I thoroughly enjoyed it. First there was a test. I'd assumed it'd be a standardised test. Boy was I wrong. They asked us everything from complex actuarial case studies, through our thoughts on the company and role, to translating random Esperanto phrases (based on their homologies with other languages - we weren't expected to speak Esperanto).
Another stage was to produce and perform a ten-minute presentation on any subject. Now, being a skeptic by trade, I figured there might be a way to leverage my wasted time online here. I ended up doing my presentation on "Cranks and how to spot them". There was one restriction I had to deal with, though - I didn't know how my interviewers felt about any of the cranks I was planning to dissect, so I was forced to stick to marginal stuff like astrology, dowsing and the Hoxsey treatment. In particular, I felt unable to risk going after the big guns of Creationism. I thought there'd be too high a chance of my interviewers turning out to be Hovind devotees.
Or at least I did until 30 minutes into the test, when I turned a page to see the question:
I WANT THIS JOB DAMMIT!!!
Read the full post
Actually, it was the most challenging interview process that I've had yet - and I thoroughly enjoyed it. First there was a test. I'd assumed it'd be a standardised test. Boy was I wrong. They asked us everything from complex actuarial case studies, through our thoughts on the company and role, to translating random Esperanto phrases (based on their homologies with other languages - we weren't expected to speak Esperanto).
Another stage was to produce and perform a ten-minute presentation on any subject. Now, being a skeptic by trade, I figured there might be a way to leverage my wasted time online here. I ended up doing my presentation on "Cranks and how to spot them". There was one restriction I had to deal with, though - I didn't know how my interviewers felt about any of the cranks I was planning to dissect, so I was forced to stick to marginal stuff like astrology, dowsing and the Hoxsey treatment. In particular, I felt unable to risk going after the big guns of Creationism. I thought there'd be too high a chance of my interviewers turning out to be Hovind devotees.
Or at least I did until 30 minutes into the test, when I turned a page to see the question:
Describe how evolution operates by natural selection.
I WANT THIS JOB DAMMIT!!!
Read the full post
Tuesday, September 19, 2006
CSI: the explanation
(No I'm not talking about Crime Scene Investigation, fool!)
OK, so I really should be focusing on the Protein Challenge. However, being easily sidetracked, I got thinking about Dembski's concept of CSI - Complex Specified Information. It's a surprisingly hard concept to understand, not least because AFAICT Dembski makes it as difficult as possible to do so.
The basic principle is that evolutionary processes aren't supposed to be able to produce structures that are improbable (for a sufficiently well-defined value of "improbable"), complicated (ditto) and specified. The concept of a specification is basically an attempt to extend the basic probabilistic concept of an event to handle post-hoc reasoning. A specification defines a target space of possible things that can happen.
The argument goes as follows:
1) Chance processes tend not to give results that are both unlikely and specified. So, for example, drawing 13 cards and getting all spades is highly unlikely, and you'd rightly assume that someone had tinkered with the deck.
2) Natural processes (regularities) tend not to give results that are both complex and specified. For example, though a snowflake may be complex, you won't get the same one twice.
3) Hence, anything that is complex, improbable and specified is most likely the result of intelligent intervention (nb. human brains apparently don't qualify as natural processes).
There are some problems when you try to extend this to evolution and genetic algorithms and so on - both are quite capable of generating complex, improbable, extremely useful systems. Dembski gets round this by saying that genetic algorithms can generate CSI if and only if the target space associated with the specification represents a local optimum of the fitness function. GAs work if and only if the problem you feed them (fitness function) is actually the one you want solved (specification).
That's why examples like the infamous "methinks it is like a weasel" work - the specification we choose (the text) is 'coincidentally' identical to the optimum of the fitness function. Dembski, if I understand correctly, points out that, unless we select our specification to correspond to the fitness function we're using, we still won't generate CSI. We'll have complex information, but it won't match the right specification. As such, he feels justified in saying that, in feeding the GA the right problem for our desired solution, we're "smuggling" CSI into the system.
The problem here is that, looking at the "fitness function" to which real-world genes are exposed, we see that it's basically something along the lines of "ability to survive and breed". In that context, the ability for a gene or combination of genes to produce something like a flagellum would certainly be of value for survival, and hence could represent a local optimum of the fitness function. The flagellum could evolve despite its CSI, because evolution would be selecting for the same underlying trait that we're basing our specification on - ability to live long and prosper.
Thus, simply by basing his specifications on the functionality of a system, Dembski is setting up a range of target spaces that evolution can quite definitely find. It's something of a Texan Marksman issue - Dembski is running round painting targets around all the areas that evolution by natural selection is naturally inclined to hit.
Key terms:
Complex - refers to Kolmogorov complexity, best thought of as a measure of how easily a system can be described. So, for example, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" would be low-complexity, "AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH" would be higher, and a random string like "BJECDWYIVFYUEUBUFIIHI" would be highest.
Information - refers to Shannon information, also known as the "surprisal" of a system. So, for example, "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE" would be fairly low-information because E is a common letter - it doesn't surprise us to see it. "I LIKE FISH" would be higher, as not all of its components occur with such frequency. "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" would be very unexpected (except in the context of really strong beer) so gets a high "surprisal" value.
Target space - refers to a set of states that we'd like the system to end up in. So, for example, the target space of a system composed of lots of bits of wood might be a bookshelf.
Search space - refers to all the states that a system could end up in. So, for example, the search space of a system composed of bits of wood could include both bookshelves and mere piles of planks.
Specification - a simple delineation of the target space. For example, the specification "bookshelf".
Genetic algorithm - a program that attempts to imitate evolution in a model system.
Fitness function - something that allows a GA to tell which of a group of organisms is the most "fit". In the real world, the primary attributes of the fitness function are ability to survive (natural selection) and ability to attract mates (sexual selection).
Local optimum - an area of the search space where there are no small changes that can increase the corresponding organisms' fitness. If you think of fitness as corresponding to height on a graph, the local optima are the peaks of the resulting mountain range.
Read the full post
OK, so I really should be focusing on the Protein Challenge. However, being easily sidetracked, I got thinking about Dembski's concept of CSI - Complex Specified Information. It's a surprisingly hard concept to understand, not least because AFAICT Dembski makes it as difficult as possible to do so.
The basic principle is that evolutionary processes aren't supposed to be able to produce structures that are improbable (for a sufficiently well-defined value of "improbable"), complicated (ditto) and specified. The concept of a specification is basically an attempt to extend the basic probabilistic concept of an event to handle post-hoc reasoning. A specification defines a target space of possible things that can happen.
The argument goes as follows:
1) Chance processes tend not to give results that are both unlikely and specified. So, for example, drawing 13 cards and getting all spades is highly unlikely, and you'd rightly assume that someone had tinkered with the deck.
2) Natural processes (regularities) tend not to give results that are both complex and specified. For example, though a snowflake may be complex, you won't get the same one twice.
3) Hence, anything that is complex, improbable and specified is most likely the result of intelligent intervention (nb. human brains apparently don't qualify as natural processes).
There are some problems when you try to extend this to evolution and genetic algorithms and so on - both are quite capable of generating complex, improbable, extremely useful systems. Dembski gets round this by saying that genetic algorithms can generate CSI if and only if the target space associated with the specification represents a local optimum of the fitness function. GAs work if and only if the problem you feed them (fitness function) is actually the one you want solved (specification).
That's why examples like the infamous "methinks it is like a weasel" work - the specification we choose (the text) is 'coincidentally' identical to the optimum of the fitness function. Dembski, if I understand correctly, points out that, unless we select our specification to correspond to the fitness function we're using, we still won't generate CSI. We'll have complex information, but it won't match the right specification. As such, he feels justified in saying that, in feeding the GA the right problem for our desired solution, we're "smuggling" CSI into the system.
The problem here is that, looking at the "fitness function" to which real-world genes are exposed, we see that it's basically something along the lines of "ability to survive and breed". In that context, the ability for a gene or combination of genes to produce something like a flagellum would certainly be of value for survival, and hence could represent a local optimum of the fitness function. The flagellum could evolve despite its CSI, because evolution would be selecting for the same underlying trait that we're basing our specification on - ability to live long and prosper.
Thus, simply by basing his specifications on the functionality of a system, Dembski is setting up a range of target spaces that evolution can quite definitely find. It's something of a Texan Marksman issue - Dembski is running round painting targets around all the areas that evolution by natural selection is naturally inclined to hit.
Key terms:
Complex - refers to Kolmogorov complexity, best thought of as a measure of how easily a system can be described. So, for example, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" would be low-complexity, "AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH" would be higher, and a random string like "BJECDWYIVFYUEUBUFIIHI" would be highest.
Information - refers to Shannon information, also known as the "surprisal" of a system. So, for example, "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE" would be fairly low-information because E is a common letter - it doesn't surprise us to see it. "I LIKE FISH" would be higher, as not all of its components occur with such frequency. "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" would be very unexpected (except in the context of really strong beer) so gets a high "surprisal" value.
Target space - refers to a set of states that we'd like the system to end up in. So, for example, the target space of a system composed of lots of bits of wood might be a bookshelf.
Search space - refers to all the states that a system could end up in. So, for example, the search space of a system composed of bits of wood could include both bookshelves and mere piles of planks.
Specification - a simple delineation of the target space. For example, the specification "bookshelf".
Genetic algorithm - a program that attempts to imitate evolution in a model system.
Fitness function - something that allows a GA to tell which of a group of organisms is the most "fit". In the real world, the primary attributes of the fitness function are ability to survive (natural selection) and ability to attract mates (sexual selection).
Local optimum - an area of the search space where there are no small changes that can increase the corresponding organisms' fitness. If you think of fitness as corresponding to height on a graph, the local optima are the peaks of the resulting mountain range.
Read the full post
Friday, September 08, 2006
Overdoing it
OK, so recently I've been looking for a job (God hel^W^W Allah sav^W^W somebody stop me!). This has been scary - it'll be my first job since graduating.
One company I've applied to is an actuarial-type firm, although they seem a bit less straight-laced than most. In particular, they obviously like to feel they're giving their applicants a challenge, an attitude that resulted in me getting this request in my inbox:
This is not a request you make of Lifewish if you value your sanity. I am the master of overkill.
First, the 100 words. Any medium, hmm? How about Haiku? Ten stanzas of haiku, to be precise, detailing all the excellent qualities I have to offer.
Of course, it'll be a few minutes before they figure out it's in Haiku. I locked it with a challenge. The job application process should be as much about the company as the applicant.
And for the challenge? Well, what could be a better continuation of the Japanese theme than a Sudoku problem? Which I generated using code I wrote from scratch. It's got the company initials picked out in numbers in it.
Of course, I couldn't have people peeking at the answer, so I encrypted my 100 words with a Vigenere-style cipher, using the Sudoku board as its key. That'll teach 'em to ask for experience of VBA and Excel.
Some people claim I overreact to challenges. I don't see it, myself.
Read the full post
One company I've applied to is an actuarial-type firm, although they seem a bit less straight-laced than most. In particular, they obviously like to feel they're giving their applicants a challenge, an attitude that resulted in me getting this request in my inbox:
In order to progress to the next stage we need to be impressed. In ANY medium of your choice, using no more than 100 words, please convince us why you should be selected for the {company name} Graduate scheme? (Please note that no further guidance will be provided).
This is not a request you make of Lifewish if you value your sanity. I am the master of overkill.
First, the 100 words. Any medium, hmm? How about Haiku? Ten stanzas of haiku, to be precise, detailing all the excellent qualities I have to offer.
Of course, it'll be a few minutes before they figure out it's in Haiku. I locked it with a challenge. The job application process should be as much about the company as the applicant.
And for the challenge? Well, what could be a better continuation of the Japanese theme than a Sudoku problem? Which I generated using code I wrote from scratch. It's got the company initials picked out in numbers in it.
Of course, I couldn't have people peeking at the answer, so I encrypted my 100 words with a Vigenere-style cipher, using the Sudoku board as its key. That'll teach 'em to ask for experience of VBA and Excel.
Some people claim I overreact to challenges. I don't see it, myself.
Read the full post
Friday, August 25, 2006
The Task Ahead
And the Protein Challenge is underway! But of course, before I can start delving into the literature there's some stuff we need to get out of the way first. Namely: what are we actually trying to test?
Why so uptight?
The reason I think it's important to scope this challenge out in detail beforehand can be expressed in two words: goalpost shifting. Now, Paul is very good on this front compared to the vast majority of online debaters, but even he has his moments, and I'm sure I do too. Scoping everything out in advance means that neither of us can get confused (accidentally or otherwise) about what we were setting out to demonstrate. As I know from long hours of arguing with my sister, this can save much acrimony in later life.
The proof of the pudding
What is it we're setting out to achieve? The goal of this challenge is to answer the concerns Paul expressed in the following comment:
This challenge (there may be others) is therefore specifically addressed at seeing whether evolutionary processes can efficiently optimise the functionality of a protein. This is not going to be easy - the production of proteins from DNA sequences is not terribly easy to compute, and the effect of those proteins even less so. As such, we'll need to break the problem down a bit (see later).
The groundrules
1) This challenge will only be considering the protein-space of one protein task. This could be, for example, the ability to catalyse a given reaction. Selection of the task will be contingent on the ability to find both a number of different proteins in the task's protein-space and a means of determining success at the task. This challenge will not consider:
a) the ability of organisms' genomes to find the protein-space in the first place
b) the origins of the genome itself
c) [more negatives will be added here as necessary]
2) This challenge will proceed using only biologically-realistic information:
a) All minor properties of the GA will be accompanied with journal or textbook references supporting their acceptability
b) The model used for determining the efficacy of proteins will be tested for accuracy before use. If it's not accurate, I'll go back to the drawing board and pick a more accurate but harder option.
3) On completion, the resulting GA will be initialised with a population of proteins that are distinctly suboptimal at their task
4) The party whose conclusions were not supported by the program's results will (if they so wish) have two weeks to pinpoint any unrealistic components, citing academic papers where appropriate. If any are found, the GA will be changed as necessary and rerun. The loser this time round will have only one week to point to inaccuracies.
The breakdown
I've already discussed the primary division between setting up the fitness function and incorporating it into a GA. The hard part here is the first bit, which I see as breaking down into three essential components:
1) Figuring out what a given protein's physical properties (shape, configuration, charge distribution) are
2) Figuring out how they'll perform with respect to the protein-space's assigned task
3) Figuring out what effect that'll have on the whole organism
That effect (fitness) can then be used to determine each organism's survival chances, as is necessary for the GA to function.
Once I've done that I'll go into more detail on the creation of the GA.
Isn't this overkill?
Yes, and quite horribly so given that all Paul wanted was a demonstration that this stuff was possible. The reason I'm going so overboard on this is because I have every intention of using the code I produce here for other stuff in future (there will be other challenges to answer other questions, such as the ease with which the various protein-spaces can be located). I'd also like the demonstration to be as conclusive as possible, of course.
Read the full post
Why so uptight?
The reason I think it's important to scope this challenge out in detail beforehand can be expressed in two words: goalpost shifting. Now, Paul is very good on this front compared to the vast majority of online debaters, but even he has his moments, and I'm sure I do too. Scoping everything out in advance means that neither of us can get confused (accidentally or otherwise) about what we were setting out to demonstrate. As I know from long hours of arguing with my sister, this can save much acrimony in later life.
The proof of the pudding
What is it we're setting out to achieve? The goal of this challenge is to answer the concerns Paul expressed in the following comment:
"When a protein emerges ... it will tend to improve its performance towards its local maximum." I am happy with this in some contexts - where there is strong selection. But I would like to see this at least demonstrated in representative computer models before I would accept that this works in nature.
This challenge (there may be others) is therefore specifically addressed at seeing whether evolutionary processes can efficiently optimise the functionality of a protein. This is not going to be easy - the production of proteins from DNA sequences is not terribly easy to compute, and the effect of those proteins even less so. As such, we'll need to break the problem down a bit (see later).
The groundrules
1) This challenge will only be considering the protein-space of one protein task. This could be, for example, the ability to catalyse a given reaction. Selection of the task will be contingent on the ability to find both a number of different proteins in the task's protein-space and a means of determining success at the task. This challenge will not consider:
a) the ability of organisms' genomes to find the protein-space in the first place
b) the origins of the genome itself
c) [more negatives will be added here as necessary]
2) This challenge will proceed using only biologically-realistic information:
a) All minor properties of the GA will be accompanied with journal or textbook references supporting their acceptability
b) The model used for determining the efficacy of proteins will be tested for accuracy before use. If it's not accurate, I'll go back to the drawing board and pick a more accurate but harder option.
3) On completion, the resulting GA will be initialised with a population of proteins that are distinctly suboptimal at their task
4) The party whose conclusions were not supported by the program's results will (if they so wish) have two weeks to pinpoint any unrealistic components, citing academic papers where appropriate. If any are found, the GA will be changed as necessary and rerun. The loser this time round will have only one week to point to inaccuracies.
The breakdown
I've already discussed the primary division between setting up the fitness function and incorporating it into a GA. The hard part here is the first bit, which I see as breaking down into three essential components:
1) Figuring out what a given protein's physical properties (shape, configuration, charge distribution) are
2) Figuring out how they'll perform with respect to the protein-space's assigned task
3) Figuring out what effect that'll have on the whole organism
That effect (fitness) can then be used to determine each organism's survival chances, as is necessary for the GA to function.
Once I've done that I'll go into more detail on the creation of the GA.
Isn't this overkill?
Yes, and quite horribly so given that all Paul wanted was a demonstration that this stuff was possible. The reason I'm going so overboard on this is because I have every intention of using the code I produce here for other stuff in future (there will be other challenges to answer other questions, such as the ease with which the various protein-spaces can be located). I'd also like the demonstration to be as conclusive as possible, of course.
Read the full post
The Protein Challenge
Index of posts relating to this challenge, and list of tasks necessary for its completion.
Background material
Introduction
Open Mouth, Insert Money #2
Challenge Specs
The Task Ahead
Fitness evaluation
Genotype->phenotype
Phenotype->efficacy
Efficacy->fitness
Genetic algorithm
Realistic behaviour
Results
Conclusions
Read the full post
Background material
Introduction
Open Mouth, Insert Money #2
Challenge Specs
The Task Ahead
Fitness evaluation
Genotype->phenotype
Phenotype->efficacy
Efficacy->fitness
Genetic algorithm
Realistic behaviour
Results
Conclusions
Read the full post
Open mouth, insert money #2
I've been cutting back my online debating recently in favour of doing some actual learning wrt computational biology. However, one culture-wars blog I have kept visiting is Exile From Groggs, which is the most sane ID blog I've found to date.
In particular, it's occasionally possible to convince Paul (the blog owner) of something, given sufficient effort. This makes him practically unique in the world of blogging, let alone the ID community's segment thereof. And it's on this note I wish to speak.
I recently spent some effort trying to figure out exactly which parts of evolutionary theory it was that Paul had a problem with. One of the issues that came up was that, whilst he was broadly convinced that genetic algorithms such as real-world evolution could optimise very simple systems, he wasn't sure how they'd handle something as complicated as proteins, where the search spaces can be Bad And Wrong. The challenge was laid down and accepted: demonstrate that evolutionary algorithms could work in the context of proteins.
This challenge actually has two major components. Firstly, I need to determine a sequence->fitness mapping for a given selection of proteins. Secondly, I need to implement an algorithm using both this and biologically-realistic reproduction&mutation to simulate the real-world evolutionary optimisation of the protein within a given protein-space*. The first part is by far the more difficult.
I threw out a bunch of suggestions as to how this could be computationally modelled (rather than having to produce every single possible protein variant in the lab), and the option that seems to have been settled on is:
In bioinformatics, this sort of thing can be worked through quite easily, but it's all too simple to produce hideously wrong answers. In particular, in this case it'll be fairly easy to determine which proteins will work well - the challenge will be avoiding false negatives.
More after the break.
* Syntactic note: we've been referring to the space of protein sequences that perform acceptably at a given task as the protein-space of that task. If we talk about the protein-space of a protein, we're talking about all the proteins that accomplish one of the same tasks as that protein in roughly the same fashion as that protein. This does not include wildly different proteins that happen to perform the same task; we're concerned primarily with families of similar proteins.
Read the full post
In particular, it's occasionally possible to convince Paul (the blog owner) of something, given sufficient effort. This makes him practically unique in the world of blogging, let alone the ID community's segment thereof. And it's on this note I wish to speak.
I recently spent some effort trying to figure out exactly which parts of evolutionary theory it was that Paul had a problem with. One of the issues that came up was that, whilst he was broadly convinced that genetic algorithms such as real-world evolution could optimise very simple systems, he wasn't sure how they'd handle something as complicated as proteins, where the search spaces can be Bad And Wrong. The challenge was laid down and accepted: demonstrate that evolutionary algorithms could work in the context of proteins.
This challenge actually has two major components. Firstly, I need to determine a sequence->fitness mapping for a given selection of proteins. Secondly, I need to implement an algorithm using both this and biologically-realistic reproduction&mutation to simulate the real-world evolutionary optimisation of the protein within a given protein-space*. The first part is by far the more difficult.
I threw out a bunch of suggestions as to how this could be computationally modelled (rather than having to produce every single possible protein variant in the lab), and the option that seems to have been settled on is:
I work backwards by looking at an existing protein family, comparing the efficacy of the various proteins, and assuming that everything similar to one of these is also effective. I use some kind of sequence-based active-site-detecting process to fine-tune our guesstimate of the effectiveness of the similar proteins
In bioinformatics, this sort of thing can be worked through quite easily, but it's all too simple to produce hideously wrong answers. In particular, in this case it'll be fairly easy to determine which proteins will work well - the challenge will be avoiding false negatives.
More after the break.
* Syntactic note: we've been referring to the space of protein sequences that perform acceptably at a given task as the protein-space of that task. If we talk about the protein-space of a protein, we're talking about all the proteins that accomplish one of the same tasks as that protein in roughly the same fashion as that protein. This does not include wildly different proteins that happen to perform the same task; we're concerned primarily with families of similar proteins.
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Sunday, August 20, 2006
ID's hard evidence
(AKA: Stoner Logic 101)
In response to this article in the York Daily Record, and to this thread on a blog I frequent, I feel I've finally gotten to grips with the evidence behind ID. I feel it can best be summarised by the following dialogue:
"Wow, dude, look at this flagellum thingy. That is soooo cool, man"
"Dude, what if... like... what if all these cool things were made by some Big Reefer in the sky? Cos, y'know, if I was a Big Reefer, that's the sort of thing I'd make..."
"Woah, duuuuude!"
There we have it, the conclusive disproof of evolutionary theory. I expect to win Nobel prizes for this day's work.
Needless to say, however, I have some doubts about the Quality of this argument.
Read the full post
In response to this article in the York Daily Record, and to this thread on a blog I frequent, I feel I've finally gotten to grips with the evidence behind ID. I feel it can best be summarised by the following dialogue:
"Wow, dude, look at this flagellum thingy. That is soooo cool, man"
"Dude, what if... like... what if all these cool things were made by some Big Reefer in the sky? Cos, y'know, if I was a Big Reefer, that's the sort of thing I'd make..."
"Woah, duuuuude!"
There we have it, the conclusive disproof of evolutionary theory. I expect to win Nobel prizes for this day's work.
Needless to say, however, I have some doubts about the Quality of this argument.
Read the full post
Saturday, June 03, 2006
Poor quality in action: Let's have a festival!
There's currently a very loud festival going on in the field that's two streets over from me. Incredibly noisy drum music, lots of whistles and stuff. I remember that last year, when I was living in a room looking out onto the festival, the thumping made dust come down my chimney in spurts.
Which would all be well and good, and I'd be out there partying with the rest of them, if they hadn't scheduled it all right in the middle of exam season. It's two days til my exams start and there's no way I'll be able to focus. I'll be lucky if I get any sleep tonight - they play til late iirc. The short conclusion is that their timing lacks quality.
The long conclusion is unprintable.
Update: I originally thought that the drum noise was being amplified by concert-sized speakers. Turns out that they have about 40 drums and people are parading around banging them.
Read the full post
Which would all be well and good, and I'd be out there partying with the rest of them, if they hadn't scheduled it all right in the middle of exam season. It's two days til my exams start and there's no way I'll be able to focus. I'll be lucky if I get any sleep tonight - they play til late iirc. The short conclusion is that their timing lacks quality.
The long conclusion is unprintable.
Update: I originally thought that the drum noise was being amplified by concert-sized speakers. Turns out that they have about 40 drums and people are parading around banging them.
Read the full post
Tuesday, April 18, 2006
Woah, dude!
The attentive reader may have noted that, when I was muttering about the reality-based community, I dropped some fairly heavy hints that membership of the RBC was not the only, or even necessarily the best, way to run one's life. That ties in with the rather incoherent post about just getting on with it.
I think I've actually managed to figure out how to turn the get-up-and-go attitude on and off at will. It's really weird - I get roughly the same sensation as when I'm riding the tail end of an all-night work session. Imagination stops. Distractions cease to distract. I no longer have a strong urge to read, blog or laze about.
What's slightly worrying me is that this attitude doesn't feel particularly contrived - I'm not acting it out, I'm just changing into a pre-existing gear. That opens up the rather worrying possibility that, if I get too used to this new mode, I'll get stuck like that. Which would rather suck.
I always laugh when I see cartoons about people smoking weed and going into obscure speculation about the nature of mind. I guess I just find it strange that some people need drugs for that...
Read the full post
I think I've actually managed to figure out how to turn the get-up-and-go attitude on and off at will. It's really weird - I get roughly the same sensation as when I'm riding the tail end of an all-night work session. Imagination stops. Distractions cease to distract. I no longer have a strong urge to read, blog or laze about.
What's slightly worrying me is that this attitude doesn't feel particularly contrived - I'm not acting it out, I'm just changing into a pre-existing gear. That opens up the rather worrying possibility that, if I get too used to this new mode, I'll get stuck like that. Which would rather suck.
I always laugh when I see cartoons about people smoking weed and going into obscure speculation about the nature of mind. I guess I just find it strange that some people need drugs for that...
Read the full post
Monday, April 17, 2006
Faith vs. Reality
When I was younger, I spent about 7 years attending a weekly Christian youth club. They were wonderful people, and I spent many happy hours discussing theology with them. One thing that I never really got, though, was their reliance on faith.
Faith (heretofore defined as belief in the absence of evidence) is a very odd thing. When applied to many situations, most people would agree that it is synonymous with stupidity - for example, having faith that you can jump off a skyscraper and survive is not terribly sensible. And yet a vast number of people use it to justify strongly-held beliefs. Where's the borderline between situations where faith is and isn't acceptable, and how is that borderline justified?
My belief is that no such borderline is justified. I have never seen any situation where faith has resulted in a more accurate understanding of reality. Holy books do not generally tell us any confirmable facts about the universe that we didn't already know. They don't make any testable predictions that we couldn't already propose. Faith, when applied to understanding the universe, is completely useless.
So why do people have so much respect for faith? One way or another, I think it's an intellectual cop-out. In its simplest form, it acts as an excuse for not thinking much about the universe. It allows an individual to opt out of the reality-based community with a clear conscience. It means they don't have to waste time that could be better used advancing their position in life. The reality-based community is seriously under-represented amongst the CEOs of major corporations, and I strongly suspect that this is why.
A slightly more complex variant arises from intuitive perceptions of the universe. For example, in this article in the Observer, Richard Harries argues that:
It's possible for an idea to Just Feel Right to someone. They can't justify it, but they "know" it's true - so they call upon faith to spring the trap of rationality they find themselves caught in. Faith allows them to treat objective questions ("does God exist?") as if they were subjective questions ("was Beckett a great playwright?"). Faith claims that their intuitive feelings constitute a valid argument. The problem with this, of course, is that intuitive beliefs about the universe have a regrettable tendency to be horribly inaccurate, to the point that overcoming these intuitions is an essential part of joining the reality-based community. As a rule, "self-evident truths" generally aren't.
Of course, faith of this sort has trouble surviving in a critical environment. Any scientist claiming to hold to a scientifically-testable belief on the basis of faith can and will be laughed at. There's a definite social component to faith, and I suspect that it is often provided by those whom faith does benefit - the hucksters and frauds. Religion will never die out whilst there's good money to be made exploiting those who adhere to it. The demagogues, the televangelists, the politicians who are miraculously born again just when their popularity needs a boost - all these, and the honest people they dupe, contribute to an atmosphere where criticism of faith is considered unacceptable. The same goes for other snake-oil salesmen - the psychics, the Qabbalists, the sellers of "alternative therapies".
As many of the crazier religious folk would claim, there is indeed something of an underground war going on. In the red corner, we have the scientists, the skeptics, the folk who insist on hard evidence before they'll believe. In the blue corner, we have the fundamentalists, the quacks, the preachers and the innocent folks who believe them. The former group has by far the best credibility; the latter group has by far the most convincing rhetoric. Who will win? That remains to be seen.
[Reality Check Disclaimer: This post is a rather speculative rhetorical piece, and as such may not be accurate. If you feel that any of the arguments or conclusions presented are incorrect or insufficiently justified, please call me on it]
Read the full post
Faith (heretofore defined as belief in the absence of evidence) is a very odd thing. When applied to many situations, most people would agree that it is synonymous with stupidity - for example, having faith that you can jump off a skyscraper and survive is not terribly sensible. And yet a vast number of people use it to justify strongly-held beliefs. Where's the borderline between situations where faith is and isn't acceptable, and how is that borderline justified?
My belief is that no such borderline is justified. I have never seen any situation where faith has resulted in a more accurate understanding of reality. Holy books do not generally tell us any confirmable facts about the universe that we didn't already know. They don't make any testable predictions that we couldn't already propose. Faith, when applied to understanding the universe, is completely useless.
So why do people have so much respect for faith? One way or another, I think it's an intellectual cop-out. In its simplest form, it acts as an excuse for not thinking much about the universe. It allows an individual to opt out of the reality-based community with a clear conscience. It means they don't have to waste time that could be better used advancing their position in life. The reality-based community is seriously under-represented amongst the CEOs of major corporations, and I strongly suspect that this is why.
A slightly more complex variant arises from intuitive perceptions of the universe. For example, in this article in the Observer, Richard Harries argues that:
However, religious belief is a matter of considered judgment. It involves our aesthetic sense, our moral judgment, our imagination and our intuition. In this respect, it is not totally different from making a judgment, for example, that Beckett is a great playwright, the war against Iraq was wrong or the sheer existence of the universe is awesome.
It's possible for an idea to Just Feel Right to someone. They can't justify it, but they "know" it's true - so they call upon faith to spring the trap of rationality they find themselves caught in. Faith allows them to treat objective questions ("does God exist?") as if they were subjective questions ("was Beckett a great playwright?"). Faith claims that their intuitive feelings constitute a valid argument. The problem with this, of course, is that intuitive beliefs about the universe have a regrettable tendency to be horribly inaccurate, to the point that overcoming these intuitions is an essential part of joining the reality-based community. As a rule, "self-evident truths" generally aren't.
Of course, faith of this sort has trouble surviving in a critical environment. Any scientist claiming to hold to a scientifically-testable belief on the basis of faith can and will be laughed at. There's a definite social component to faith, and I suspect that it is often provided by those whom faith does benefit - the hucksters and frauds. Religion will never die out whilst there's good money to be made exploiting those who adhere to it. The demagogues, the televangelists, the politicians who are miraculously born again just when their popularity needs a boost - all these, and the honest people they dupe, contribute to an atmosphere where criticism of faith is considered unacceptable. The same goes for other snake-oil salesmen - the psychics, the Qabbalists, the sellers of "alternative therapies".
As many of the crazier religious folk would claim, there is indeed something of an underground war going on. In the red corner, we have the scientists, the skeptics, the folk who insist on hard evidence before they'll believe. In the blue corner, we have the fundamentalists, the quacks, the preachers and the innocent folks who believe them. The former group has by far the best credibility; the latter group has by far the most convincing rhetoric. Who will win? That remains to be seen.
[Reality Check Disclaimer: This post is a rather speculative rhetorical piece, and as such may not be accurate. If you feel that any of the arguments or conclusions presented are incorrect or insufficiently justified, please call me on it]
Read the full post
Sunday, April 16, 2006
Putting my money where my mouth is
In the last post, I waxed eloquently about the value of a reality-based approach to the world. As I mentioned, a key part of this is testing one's understanding against the facts and the alternative hypotheses to the greatest extent possible. That's where this thread comes in.
If you have seen me make any statement that you disagree with, and you think your position is better backed up by facts and logic than mine, this is the thread for you. Tear down my views and/or build up your own, and show no mercy. If I feel you have a more watertight case than me, I'll publically concede. If you manage to overturn one of my more fundamental precepts, for example my atheism, I'll send you a bottle of Scotch (P&P charges permitting).
Additionally, feel free to insist that I provide support for any position that you feel I haven't fully justified. Be as inquisitorial as you like!
All this can be considered to be a standing offer - it's in no way limited to this thread - but having as much of the discussion in one place as possible can't hurt.
Read the full post
If you have seen me make any statement that you disagree with, and you think your position is better backed up by facts and logic than mine, this is the thread for you. Tear down my views and/or build up your own, and show no mercy. If I feel you have a more watertight case than me, I'll publically concede. If you manage to overturn one of my more fundamental precepts, for example my atheism, I'll send you a bottle of Scotch (P&P charges permitting).
Additionally, feel free to insist that I provide support for any position that you feel I haven't fully justified. Be as inquisitorial as you like!
All this can be considered to be a standing offer - it's in no way limited to this thread - but having as much of the discussion in one place as possible can't hurt.
Read the full post
The reality-based community
There is an ideal. It claims that a vital prerequisite of a high-Quality life is an accurate understanding of how the universe works. Recently I've taken to referring to this ideal's adherents as the reality-based community.
This is not the same as the scientific community - it's possible to be a member of the RBC without being a scientist, and it's possible for a scientist to have non-reality-based beliefs. Nor is it the same as atheism - atheists can be dogmatic too - although at the present time I'd say that atheism is a necessary condition for membership (but I'm an atheist myself so I would say that...). It's not quite the same as scepticism - unjustified scepticism is not reality-based. However, it can reasonably be considered to be the motivation for all of these behaviours.
The heart of this ideal is a willingness to admit when you're wrong coupled with an active drive to make sure that your inaccuracies get exposed as quickly as possible. It's about seeking out alternative hypotheses and analysing them on their own merits. It's about not rejecting ideas just because they conflict with your understanding of the world. It's also about ditching ideas the moment you find yourself unable to support them, in an appropriately public manner, no matter how attracted to them you are. It's about truth, often at the expense of beauty.
As the origins of the phrase suggest, this viewpoint has its weaknesses. Members of the reality-based community, dedicated as they are to building an accurate understanding of the universe, may have comparatively less drive to achieve. They will generally have made conscious efforts to avoid being ruled by their feelings and instincts, so may actually be slightly handicapped in situations where intuitive responses are more appropriate (in particular, members of the RBC are unlikely to be good at rhetoric).
However, if you want an answer to a factual question about the universe, ask someone who follows this ideal. Their answer may be wrong (and in fact they'll often caution you against assuming that it's 100% right), but it definitely won't be crazy.
No-one's perfect. There's not a single person in this world who is fully a member of the reality-based community. We all have our dogmas, and it's painful to let them go - and, until we do, we can't consider ourselves part of this select yet self-selecting group. In my opinion, however, it's an ideal worth aiming for.
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This is not the same as the scientific community - it's possible to be a member of the RBC without being a scientist, and it's possible for a scientist to have non-reality-based beliefs. Nor is it the same as atheism - atheists can be dogmatic too - although at the present time I'd say that atheism is a necessary condition for membership (but I'm an atheist myself so I would say that...). It's not quite the same as scepticism - unjustified scepticism is not reality-based. However, it can reasonably be considered to be the motivation for all of these behaviours.
The heart of this ideal is a willingness to admit when you're wrong coupled with an active drive to make sure that your inaccuracies get exposed as quickly as possible. It's about seeking out alternative hypotheses and analysing them on their own merits. It's about not rejecting ideas just because they conflict with your understanding of the world. It's also about ditching ideas the moment you find yourself unable to support them, in an appropriately public manner, no matter how attracted to them you are. It's about truth, often at the expense of beauty.
As the origins of the phrase suggest, this viewpoint has its weaknesses. Members of the reality-based community, dedicated as they are to building an accurate understanding of the universe, may have comparatively less drive to achieve. They will generally have made conscious efforts to avoid being ruled by their feelings and instincts, so may actually be slightly handicapped in situations where intuitive responses are more appropriate (in particular, members of the RBC are unlikely to be good at rhetoric).
However, if you want an answer to a factual question about the universe, ask someone who follows this ideal. Their answer may be wrong (and in fact they'll often caution you against assuming that it's 100% right), but it definitely won't be crazy.
No-one's perfect. There's not a single person in this world who is fully a member of the reality-based community. We all have our dogmas, and it's painful to let them go - and, until we do, we can't consider ourselves part of this select yet self-selecting group. In my opinion, however, it's an ideal worth aiming for.
Read the full post
Friday, April 14, 2006
Debate: Can science justify the statement "God does not exist"?
There's one of those perennial debates brewing over at PandasThumb.org between those who (broadly speaking) think it is scientifically valid to say "God doesn't exist" and those who think it'll always be a philosophical position (including yours truly). I'm hoping to move it over here so as to avoid horribly derailing the PT thread.
Since I'm creating this thread, I get to go first! Yay!
In accordance with the rules of formal debate, I'll first define a few terms:
My position is that approaches like science and logic are merely a means to an end. They are models that we apply to the universe where appropriate in order to generate accurate predictions about what will happen next. We use them because they have turned out to be very very good at this.
I personally do my best to use them all the time, but that is a philosophical position distinct from science or logic. It is based on my (unsupportable and possibly inaccurate) belief that, in the long run, a strongly predictive model of how the universe works will enable me to be happier, and on my philosophical belief that scientific and logical methods are the best way to achieve this.
If someone felt that this was not the case, or decided that happiness was not their goal in life, then IMO they would be philosophically justified in not applying scientific or logical methods. For example, if a man was suspicious that his wife's baby was not his own, he might legitimately decide that parenthood testing was not in anyone's best interest.
I don't deny that rational approaches are consistently better than all others at determining how the universe works. I do deny that the acceptance of rational approaches follows directly from this statement. Setting rationality aside isn't necessarily a daft decision, and it's something that I feel people have the right to do - as long as they don't inflict their irrationality on me.
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Since I'm creating this thread, I get to go first! Yay!
In accordance with the rules of formal debate, I'll first define a few terms:
- Logic = inductive reasoning from premises to infallible conclusions
- Science = the scientific method = hypothesis testing and peer review. Includes both inductive and deductive reasoning.
- Philosophy = the study of scientifically-intractable problems (technically science is a branch of philosophy, but let's not go there)
My position is that approaches like science and logic are merely a means to an end. They are models that we apply to the universe where appropriate in order to generate accurate predictions about what will happen next. We use them because they have turned out to be very very good at this.
I personally do my best to use them all the time, but that is a philosophical position distinct from science or logic. It is based on my (unsupportable and possibly inaccurate) belief that, in the long run, a strongly predictive model of how the universe works will enable me to be happier, and on my philosophical belief that scientific and logical methods are the best way to achieve this.
If someone felt that this was not the case, or decided that happiness was not their goal in life, then IMO they would be philosophically justified in not applying scientific or logical methods. For example, if a man was suspicious that his wife's baby was not his own, he might legitimately decide that parenthood testing was not in anyone's best interest.
I don't deny that rational approaches are consistently better than all others at determining how the universe works. I do deny that the acceptance of rational approaches follows directly from this statement. Setting rationality aside isn't necessarily a daft decision, and it's something that I feel people have the right to do - as long as they don't inflict their irrationality on me.
Read the full post
Thursday, April 13, 2006
Cliché Invasion #1
Every so often, someone comes out with a comment that Just Works. It's a cliché in the making, a meme waiting to spread. It encapsulates some concept so beautifully that you just know you're still going to be using it in fifty years time (to the great annoyance of those around you).
On the off-chance I come up with bon mots of this sort, I'll stick 'em here. First entry (in response to this comment):
I think the problem is more that the faithful have all their eggs in one basket, and are thus made happier by evidence that it’s a well-woven basket than evidence that the handle’s about to break. As such, they tend to convince themselves that the former is correct and the latter is merely misguided anti-basket sentiment.
The result? They end up as complete basket cases.
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On the off-chance I come up with bon mots of this sort, I'll stick 'em here. First entry (in response to this comment):
I think the problem is more that the faithful have all their eggs in one basket, and are thus made happier by evidence that it’s a well-woven basket than evidence that the handle’s about to break. As such, they tend to convince themselves that the former is correct and the latter is merely misguided anti-basket sentiment.
The result? They end up as complete basket cases.
Read the full post
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